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ABSTRACT 
The Japanese economy, after spectacular performance in the decades following 
World War II, has been surprisingly weak now for more than two decades. 
This report is, on the one hand an empirical analysis of the determinants of 
economic growth in Japan during the period 1960-1990 and, on the other hand an 
attempt to explain the causes of its disappointing performance in the years 1990s 
and 2000s. It highlights the methodology of endogenous growth models to identify 
factors in the growth of Japan. The study shows that the Gross capital formation, the 
labor and technology have a positive impact on Japan's growth over the period 1960-
1990. The result also shows that the economy is affected negatively by the discount 
rates, the financial crisis and the appreciation of the yen during the years 1990s and 
2000s. 
The policy recommendations of this study are: a) Japan must maintain a high rate of 
employment in order to have a high participation rate of labor b) The sector of 
research and development of Japan needs to be strengthened to maintain the high 
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level of technology c) The policy of investment of Japan needs to be strengthened d) 
Japanese economy needs mechanisms to reduce the impact of crises on its economy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background of the study 
Finding the best way to boost the economic activity is the subject of intense debate 
in most of the countries. Over the last hundred years, most countries have 
experienced significant economic growth in historical terms. A quick overview 
shows that the phenomenon of rapid economic growth began about two centuries. 
This growth is manifested by a continual increase in aggregate real income, 
production, consumption of goods and services, not only in level but also per capita. 
Each generation gets used in richer countries to a standard of living higher than 
those of previous generations. Indeed, the improved standard of living of the 
population and ensuring social welfare are the ultimate goals of government. 
Whatever the policies, these objectives cannot be achieved without sustained 
economic growth. The economic growth is synonym of production of goods and 
services, creation of jobs and wealth. It ensures when well used, the economic, 
social and human prosperity. For all these reasons, the understanding of growth, its 
mechanisms, its determinants and its sources has always been a major concern of 
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policy makers and designers of economic policies. It is clear that economic growth 
is not a panacea for the country's problems, but it facilitates the implementation of 
public policies that complement the shortcomings of growth. In short, the growth is 
a necessary condition but not sufficient to ensure social welfare. 
After World War II, in Japan, the necessity to ensure strong economic growth and 
sustainable development has emerged as a solution to many social problems that 
undermine the country. We must remember that Japan has suffered considerable 
losses during the war. In 1945, the Japanese production represented barely a third of 
that before the war. The human loss amounted to 1.85 million (about 4% of the 
entire population), and 680 thousand injured or missing. The exports have collapsed 
and represented only 10% of exports before the war. Japan is a group of islands and 
its commercial fleet is almost completely destroyed. Prices doubled between 1946 
and 1949 creating a climate of high inflation. In addition of the damages, all the 
colonies are lost, cutting Japan's from its traditional supplies sources (ore, coal) and 
leading to the repatriation of thousands of settlers of Formosa, Manchuria and 
Korea. 
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In 1952, Japan was a "less-developed country". Through a high economic growth 
the country experienced a transition from a country of low GDP to a country of high 
GDP during the post war period especially in the 1960s. Japan was able to become 
the first developing country, in the postwar-era, to achieve the status of developed 
country. The period between 1962 and 1972 was particularly good. The GNP 
doubles for the first time between 1960 and 1965, and again between 1966 and 
1970. The economy grew at a rapid pace, exceeding 10% per annum during the 
1960s. Meanwhile the growth rate of Japan is three times that of Western powers 
and eventually Japan became the economy with the second largest GDP in the world 
in 1968. By the 1960s, the country became the second industrial power of the 
World, before becoming the second commercial power in the 1970s and the first 
financial power in the 1980s. We have to note that it is from the remnants of an 
industrial infrastructure that had suffered widespread destruction during World War 
II that Japan developed its economy. The Japanese economic miracle is the name 
given to the economic and cultural boom in Japan after the war. This expression, 
used in the media environment of the 1980s, refers to the economic and cultural 
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boom of Japan which managed to establish itself among the greatest with the 
Asian political economy where the years 1950-1960 saw the Japanese electronic and 
Optics replace the German and American products.  
The achievements of the country of the rising sun, especially in the economic field 
are impressive and attract the attention. Indeed, Japan has succeeded in a short time 
interval, a miracle that many countries failed to realize in the centuries. After its 
cruel defeat in the Second World War with losses that any other country in the world 
has undergone, Japan not only managed to recover but also emerged as an economic 
power. Indeed, by revitalizing its infrastructure, enhancing its capacity to import and 
export and its access to American technology, the country experienced the dramatic 
"Miracle Growth" between 1953 and the early 1970s. The Miracle Growth was the 
completion of a protracted historical process involving, as Edward Denison and 
William Chung showed, increased labor input, increased capital stock, advances in 
knowledge, reallocation of resources away from agriculture, and economies of scale 
which took decades and decades to realize. The unprecedented rhythm that the 
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Japanese economy has performed annually for three decades has been studied by 
economists in the world and is presented as an example for developing countries.  
However, the last decade of the twentieth century did not close in beauty the 
exceptional postwar period of growth.  On the contrary, it opens with the most 
serious economic and financial crisis of the half-century. After four years of 
speculative euphoria, the Japanese discovered the fragility of their financial strength, 
based on land values and stock market totally illusory. The values of lands were 
exceptionally high and the values of interest exceptionally low. This situation led to 
a position in which credit was both easily available and extremely cheap. In 1989, 
the prices in the stock market and in real estate rose to extravagant levels: the Nikkei 
index has tripled in four years (1985-1989), as are lands that are exchanged at more 
than 16 million yen / m2 (€ 124,300 / m2) on average in the central business districts 
of Tokyo. The asset inflation has become after four years a scourge. Not only it has 
degraded housing conditions, but it threatens to impact on overall prices. The 
authorities decide then to tighten the credit for "breaking" the bubble. It follows a 
drop in the Nikkei (down from 38 915 to 14 485 points between 1989 and 1994), 
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and land prices (-70% in central Tokyo), causing a destruction of wealth at an 
unexpected extent: in total, approximately 840 000 billion yen (€ 6525 billion), a 
year and a half of GDP, volatilized between 1990 and 1996. This led to a massive 
crash in the stock market and a debt crisis (a large proportion of the debts that had 
been run up turned bad, which in turn led to a crisis in the banking sector, with many 
banks being bailed out by the government). Thus, after decades of "miracle" since 
the World War II, Japan's economy abruptly declined in 1990s and has stagnated 
since. The recession will last more than ten years and led to the phenomenon known 
as the "lost decade". 
Similarly, the first decade of the twenty-first century has ended with poor economic 
performance to such an extent that China has robbed its place of the second creator 
of wealth of the planet. Indeed, with a strong recession in 2009 (-5.12%), Japan's 
economy has recovered in 2010, growth reached 3.9%, but that did not allow Japan 
to keep its second position facing China's rapid ascent. 
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Investigating the Japanese economy, we can conclude as figure 1 shows that After 
World War II, this country experienced a sustained expansion. GDP growth 
averaged around 10 per cent in the 1960s, 5.2 per cent in the 1970s, and 4.6 per cent 
in the 1980s, slowing because the economy had essentially caught up to the levels of 
other OECD countries. 
Figure 1: Japanese GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CEIC database. 
 
As it can be seen in the table below, the average per capita GDP growth rate is high 
during the 1950s and 1960s, began to drop since 1970s, and fell considerably in the 
1990s and 2000s. The bursting of the bubble economy in 1990 inaugurated a new 
cycle. Indeed at the beginning of this year, stock prices plummeted, followed by 
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sharp declines in real estate prices. This marked the start of a series of major 
economic recessions (collapse of the bubble economy).  
Table 1: Average annual growth rate of real GDP of Japan 
1946-1955 10.90% 
1955-1973 9.60% 
1973-90 3.90% 
1990-2000 0.50% 
2000-2009 0.60% 
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, National Income Statistics. 
The question thus arises acutely, why Japan had economic performance superior to 
those of other countries and had in a short time caught up with the western powers. 
The other question that arises is why the economy has abruptly ceases to grow, what 
explains this economic crisis. 
These issues have been the subject of numerous investigations. For example, Mitsuo 
Saito (1999, pp.23-151) in his book The Japanese economy has attempted to provide 
an answer to the question by identifying the causes of the high economic growth on 
the demand side on the one hand and on the other hand, on the supply side, and by 
doing a simulation of an econometric model. Regarding the recession of the 
Japanese economy there are many points of view. For example while a lot 
economists argued that the slump reflects problems with financial intermediation, 
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low rate of return to capital due to over investment (Ando, 1998), inadequate policy 
responses (Posen, 1998), (Krugman, 1998) explained that Japan was stuck in a 
liquidity trap. 
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
Following Saito, (Krugman, 1998) and many other economists who were interested 
in the questions above, this study also attempts on the one hand to provide an 
explanation to the economic performance of Japan during the period 1960-1990 and, 
on the other hand tries to find the causes of the disappointing performance during 
the period 1990-2009. 
This study will use the endogenous growth theoretical framework to develop multi-
equations structural model to derive the relationship between economic growth and 
its determinants variables. In doing this, the study will consider macroeconomic 
variables such as gross capital formation, Inflation, education, exportations, human 
capital accumulation, research and development expenditure, interest rate, exchange 
rate. The study will use Regression techniques to estimate the real per capita GDP 
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growth rate and trace the channels through which the above factors could influence 
economic growth.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and hypothesis 
This study will investigate three main questions: 
1. What is the impact of macroeconomic variables such as education, exportations, 
labor, interest rate, exchange rate, technology, inflation on the real per capita GDP 
growth rate in Japan during the postwar period? 
2. What are the causes of the Japanese economic slump of the 1990s and 2000s? 
3. Based on the investigations of question 1, what are the possible channels through 
which the factors could affect growth in Japan? 
In order to answer the first question, this study will test the following hypotheses: 
1. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the gross capital formation. 
2. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the export. 
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3. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the labor participation rate.  
4. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the human capital. 
5. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the Banking Credit. 
6. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and negatively 
related to the inflation. 
7. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the technology. 
8. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and positively 
related to the growth rate of population.  
9. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and negatively 
related to the oil shocks. 
 To answer the second question, this study will test the following hypotheses: 
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1. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and negatively 
related to the appreciation of the yen during the period of recession. 
2. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and negatively 
related to the increase of the central bank discount rates during the period of 
recession. 
3. Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are affected by the 1990s 
financial crises.  
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
This study is an addition to the literature of empirical studies of Japanese economic 
growth and will make the following contributions: 
Develop a model that will find the variables that affect the growth rate of the 
Japanese economy. 
Unlike the previous studies, this study will consider two periods: the period of 
economic growth (1960-1990) and the period of the decline of the Japanese 
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economy (1990-2009). It will analyze at the same time the determinants of the 
Japanese economic growth and the causes of its collapse. 
This study is expected to contribute to the empirical literature of Japanese economic 
growth by applying appropriate econometric techniques to test the structural model 
in order to trace the possible channels through which the macroeconomics variables 
influence the Japanese economic performance.  
 
1.4 Organization of the study 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyses the features 
of the Japanese economy. Chapter 3 is devoted to the economic growth during the 
post war period and to the explanation of the causes of the recession in growth 
during the 1990s and after. 
 Chapter 4 reviews the literature on economic growth theories, with emphasis on 
the new growth theories, as well as the recent empirical growth studies conducted on 
the Japan economy. Chapter 5 focuses on the theoretical framework and the 
specification of the growth model used in this study. Chapter 6 presents the 
14 
 
methodology and the empirical testing and analyzes and interprets the results of the 
regression. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions, the policy recommendations and 
prospects for Japan economy. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PROFILE OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
Japan (Nihon in Japanese, "Land of the Rising Sun"), East Asian state located off 
the coast of Russia and Korea, consists of four main islands oriented along an arc 
northeast - southwest (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu) and more than 6,800 
smaller islands. Japan's total area is 377,837 sq. km. Located on the largest island, 
Honshu; Tokyo is the capital and largest city of the country. The population of 
Tokyo accounts for one-fifteenth of the total population of Japan.   
In Japan, the sea (umi) and the mountain (yama) are never far apart. The mountain 
covers three-quarters of the country. Forests account for the largest portion of the 
nation‘s surface area. It covers 66.4 percent of the nation‘s area. The farmland is 
12.8 percent of the total area of Japan. Together, forests and Farmland cover 
approximately 80 percent of the nation.  
In terms of the demography, in 2009, Japan's population was estimated at 127,510 
with a birth rate the lowest in the world: 8.5 births per 1000 inhabitants. Japan‘s 
population was the tenth largest in the world. The population density is 342 
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inhabitants per sq.km. In table 2, it is seen that the population density of Japan is 
very high.  
The annual population growth which was 0.25 percent between 1990 and 1995 fell 
to 0.22 percent for the period 1995-2000. It continued to decline and even became 
negative for the period 2005-2009 as the table 2 shows. Population growth in Japan 
has primarily been driven by natural increase which became negative from 2005 (see 
table 3). Since the 1970s the birth rate has followed a steady downtrend, reaching 
9.6 in 1993. After an increase in 1994 (10), it fell again to 8.4 in 2005.  The general 
decline in the birth rate is partly attributable to the rise in the average age at which 
women bear their first child. The fertility rate was in 1995 1.42 children per woman. 
It continued to decline, and was 1.37 in 2009 (see table 3). The death rate was 9.1 in 
2009. After the World War II, life expectancy at birth in Japan climbed sharply, and 
with 86.44 years for women and 79.59 years for men in 2009, was the highest in the 
world.  
17 
 
As the table 2 shows, the younger age population and the elderly (65 years and 
over) were respectively 13.3 percent and 22.7 percent of the total population in 
2009.  
Table2: Trends in population 
  Population 
Composition of ages (in 
percentage) 
increase rate 
of 
Density of 
population 
Years 
(in 
thousands) 
under 
14 15-64 
more 
than 65 
annual 
average (per square km) 
1960 94,302 30.2 64.1 5.7 0.92 253 
1965 99,209 25.7 68 6.3 1.02 267 
1970 104,665 24 69 7.1 1.08 281 
1975 111,940 24.3 67.7 7.9 1.35 300 
1980 117,060 23.5 67.3 9.1 0.9 314 
1985 121,049 21.5 68.2 10.3 0.67 325 
1990 123,611 18.2 69.5 12 0.42 332 
1995 125,570 16 69.4 14.5 0.31 337 
2000 126,926 14.6 68 17.3 0.21 340 
2003 127,687 14 67 19 0.16 342 
2004 127,776 13.9 66.6 19.5 0.07 343 
2005 127,756 13.6 65.3 21 -0.02 343 
2006 127,770 13.6 65.5 20.8 0 343 
2007 127,771 13.5 65 21.5 0 343 
2008 127,692 13.5 64.5 22.1 -0.06 342 
2009 127,510 13.3 64 22.7 -0.14 342 
Source: Statistics Bureau, MIC; United Nations; Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. 
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Table 3: Demographic Statistics 
  Birth rate Death rate 
Infant 
mortality 
rate 
Natural 
increase 
rate   
Life expectancy at 
birth (years) 
Year 
(per 
thousands) 
(per 
thousands) 
(per 
thousands) 
(per 
thousands) 
Total 
fertility 
rate Males Females 
1950 28.1 10.9 60.1 17.2 3.65 59.57 62.97 
1955 19.4 7.8 39.8 11.6 2.37 63.6 67.75 
1960 17.2 7.6 30.7 9.6 2 65.32 70.19 
1965 18.6 7.1 18.5 11.4 2.14 67.74 72.92 
1970 18.8 6.9 13.1 11.8 2.13 69.31 74.66 
1975 17.1 6.3 10 10.8 1.91 71.73 76.89 
1980 13.6 6.2 7.5 7.3 1.75 73.35 78.76 
1985 11.9 6.3 5.5 5.6 1.76 74.78 80.48 
1990 10 6.7 4.6 3.3 1.54 75.92 81.9 
1995 9.6 7.4 4.3 2.1 1.42 76.38 82.85 
2000 9.5 7.7 3.2 1.8 1.36 77.72 84.6 
2001 9.3 7.7 3.1 1.6 1.33 78.07 84.93 
2002 9.2 7.8 3 1.4 1.32 78.32 85.23 
2003 8.9 8 3 0.9 1.29 78.36 85.33 
2004 8.8 8.2 2.8 0.7 1.29 78.64 85.59 
2005 8.4 8.6 2.8 -0.2 1.25 78.53 85.49 
2007 8.6 8.8 2.6 -0.1 1.34 79.19 85.99 
2008 8.7 9.1 2.6 -0.4 1.37 79.29 86.05 
2009 8.5 9.1 2.4 -0.6 1.37 79.59 86.44 
Sources: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. 
 
After the presentation of the country and its demography we will now in this chapter 
analyze the characteristic of its economy. 
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2.1 An economy poor in natural resources 
In terms of natural resources the archipelago is poor. Japanese nature offers little in 
terms of energy and mining. As the table 4 shows Japanese reserves and production 
of coal and oil, and production of iron ore are less abundant than those of the other 
countries like Australia, Canada, China, former USSR, and USA.  
The mineral resources of Japan are varied but limited. Limestone, copper, lead, zinc 
and quartzite are extracted in sufficient quantities to meet domestic demand. Coal is 
the only raw material present in substantial quantities. It is extracted in eastern 
Hokkaido, Fukuoka and Kyushu. They are, however, poor coal and the extraction is 
difficult. Japan produces no bauxite, magnesium, nickel ore, and phosphate rock. 
The energy resources are almost not available and the country relies on imports for 
80% of its energy. Its energy self-sufficiency rate is 19% but dropped to 4% if we 
exclude nuclear energy (compared to that of France is 50%). Its dependence is 
extreme towards the Middle East in terms of crude oil, where it imports 87% of its 
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consumption, which requires this country to deal with instability in the region. 
Beside, Japan has no a developed refining tool. 
Table 4: Mineral resources and production 
Countries 
Resources 
in Coal Production 
Reserve in 
crude Petroleum Production 
Production In Iron-
bearing ores 
  
(Billion 
metric ton 
(million 
metric tons) 
(million metric 
tons) 
(million 
metric tons) 
(thousand metric 
tons) 
  1977 1972 1978 1990 1993 
Australia 249.3 157.2 0.3 38.7 70.3 
Canada 24.7 49.2 0.8 135.6 23.7 
China 1,011 796.6 2.7 203 86.1 
Brazil 11.6 3 0.2 46 — 
USA 2,804.80 746.7 3.8 602.9 34.9 
UK           — 70 1.4 135.2 0 
Germany 230.5 141.1 0 4.7 — 
Former 
USSR 
6,790 434 8 740.7 133.6 
Japan 8.6 6.7 0 1.2 0 
Sources: United Nations (1981, 1994b, 1993) 
 
2.2 High GDP 
Japan ranks considerably higher in GDP.  In table 5, Japan‘s GDP is the second 
largest in the world. In 1950, the level of GDP of Japan was about 4% of that of 
USA, while it is rose to 21%, 40%, and 60% of the USA value in 1970, 80, and 91, 
successively. For three decades, overall real economic growth had been spectacular - 
a 10% average in the 1960s, a 5% average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 
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1980s. In the 1990s, growth slowed markedly, averaging just 1.7%, largely because 
of the after effects of inefficient investment and an economic bubble in the late 
1980s that required a protracted period of time for firms to reduce excess debt, 
capital, and labor. However Japan‘s level of GDP remained the highest behind the 
United States GDP. 
Table 5: Total Gross Domestic Product of selected countries (in 
billions of US dollars) 
 1960 1967 1970 1980 1990 1991 2000 2009 
Australia  30.60 41.57 150.78 314.51 329.96 416.92 924.84 
Belgium 11.65 19.99 26.34 125.11 202.56 207.67 232.37 471.16 
Canada 41.09 64.76 86.30 268.89 582.72 598.20 724.91 1336.06 
China 61.3 72.05 91.50 189.4 356.93 379.46 1198.48 4985.46 
Brazil 15.16 30.59 42.32 235.02 461.95 407.33 644.70 1573.40 
Germany   208.86 919.60 1714.47 1808.60 1900.22 3330.03 
France 62.65 119.46 146.98 691.14 1244.45 1244.06 1327.96 2649.39 
United 
Kingdom 
72.32 111.18 124.79 541.91 1012.57 1055.84 1477.58 2174.53 
Japan 44.30 123.78 205.99 1070.99 3058.03 3484.77 4667.44 5068.99 
Korea, 
Rep. 
3.89 4.70 8.899 63.83 263.77 308.18 533.38 832.511 
Thailand 2.76 5.63 7.08 32.35 85.34 98.23 122.72 263.77 
United 
States 
520.53 
 
825.05 
 
1024.8 
 
2767.5 
 
5754.8 
 
5943.2 9898.8 
 
14119 
Source: world Bank indicators 
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2.3 An industrial economy  
Japan is one of the most industrialized countries in the world and its industrial 
structure has undergone a major transformation in the half-century since the end of 
World War II. Table 6 gives the industrial composition of employment and GDP 
over time. We see that the primary industry which accounted for 19.3 percent of 
employed persons and 5.9 percent for GDP in particular has fallen dramatically 
since 1970, when Japan experienced a long-standing rapid economic growth. For 
34.0% of employed persons and 43.1% for GDP, the secondary industry‘s share of 
employed persons and GDP also began to decline gradually during the 1980s. The 
Japanese economy has strongly ―tertiarized‖. The tertiary industry which accounted 
for 46.6 percent of employed persons and 50.9 percent for GDP have risen 
consistently. 
In 2005, the primary sector provided 1.5% of the production, the secondary sector 
26.8% while the tertiary sector was 71.7%. The tertiarization is mainly due to the 
development of telecommunications and financialization. 
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Table 6: Changes in Industrial Structure 
  persons Employed  Investment (GDP) (%) 
Year Primary            Secondary       Tertiary Primary            Secondary          Tertiary 
industry            industry          industry industry            industry              industry 
1955 41                     23.4                         35.5 19                       33.7                           47 
1960 32.7                  29                            38    12.8                    40.8                           46.4 
1965 24.7                  31.5                         43.7              9.5                      40                              50 
1970 19                     34                            46.6             5.9                      43                              51 
1975 13.8                  34                            51.8 5.3                      38.8                           56 
1980 11                     33.6                         55.4 3.5                      36                              60 
1985 9                       33                            57.3 3                         34.9                           62 
1990 7                       33                            59 2.4                      35.4                           62 
1995 6                       31.6                          61.8 1.8                      30.4                           68 
2000 5                       29                            64.5 1.7                      28.5                          70 
2005 4.8                    26                             67 1.5                      26.8                          71.7 
Source: Statistics Bureau, MIC; Cabinet Office. 
 
Japan is among the world's largest and most technologically advanced producers of 
motor vehicles, electronic equipment, machine tools, steel and nonferrous metals, 
ships, chemical, textiles, and is home to some of the largest and most well-known 
multinational corporations and commercial brands. Japan holds very large market 
shares in high-technology industries such as electronics, industrial chemicals, 
machine tools, electronic media and (in recent years) aerospace. Construction has 
24 
 
long been one of Japan's largest industries. The automobile, machinery and 
electronics industries are the largest and a major driving force within Japan's 
industrial sector. 
Industry is concentrated in several regions, in the following order of importance: the 
Kanto region surrounding Tokyo, especially the prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa, 
Saitama and Tokyo (the Keihin industrial region); the Nagoya metropolitan area, 
including Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Shizuoka prefectures (the Chukyo-Tokai industrial 
region); Kinki (the Keihanshin industrial region); the southwestern part of Honshu 
and northern Shikoku around the Inland Sea (the Setouchi industrial region); and the 
northern part of Kyushu (Kitakyushu). 
The main industries are: 
a) Mechanical industries, key sector 
● Shipbuilding 
Japan is the world leader since 35 years. It produces on its own 40% of world 
production (30% to Korea becoming a formidable competitor) 
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●The construction of automobile represented by Toyota, Nissan, and Honda firms: 
second place worldwide for the production. Japan is on its own 20% of cars 
produced worldwide (about 8 million cars a year). It is a sector that the country has 
recently chosen to develop highly because of its expansion and its ripple effect on 
many industries. Boom from the 50s, today it is a key sector which exports a lot (to 
the U.S first) but also has a large domestic market. 
b) The boom of high-tech industries: new pole of growth 
●The high-tech 
It is thanks to the crisis of the 1970s that Japan began a reorientation of its industrial: 
all of its strong industries (heavy, mechanical) facing the crisis, tougher competition 
and lower demand sustained, Japan began to invest more in high technology, 
convinced that these sectors were those of the XXI century. 
Japan has become a great power in high-tech industries and this sector became 
important for the country which gradually abandoned the common technologies and 
sectors with low yields. 
The high-tech industries are: 
26 
 
–Electronics: semiconductors, consumer electronics, watches, optics, 
–Office automation and Telecom: printer, photocopier, computer 
–Robotics 
c) Heavy and traditional industry  
●Steel  
Although declining (production record in 1973), the Japanese steel industry has been 
since 1993 the world leader (USSR collapse) followed by China and the U.S. The 
growth of the steel industry has been extraordinary in years from 1950 to 1973, from 
the Korean War, resulting in a boom in production. It will be the basis of the power 
of auto and naval construction. 
●The chemical industry  
●The industry of aluminum 
Japan is first a great industrial power: in 1996 the secondary sector was 1 / 3 of 
assets and 40% of GDP (share down slightly, the maximum was reached in the 80s). 
It is therefore an economic model based on the industry, very different from the 
Anglo-Saxon model centered on services. The power of this industry is the 
27 
 
foundation of Japan's success and it is because of this that Japan became a 
commercial and financial power. 
Table 7 shows the rank of Japanese transnational Company (TNC) in terms of their 
ownership of foreign assets in 1999. The largest Japanese transnational which is 
Toyota, is ranked as the sixth largest transnational in the world, and the third largest 
in the automobile sector. However, the degree of transnationality is greater in 
companies such as Honda, which owns almost 60% of its assets outside Japan. By 
1996, Toyota was in the top three, almost quadrupling its market share to 9.4%. In 
the top 10 were Nissan (5.4%), Honda (4.0%) and Mitsubishi (3.3%). In the case of 
Honda, its global market share has increased 20 times since 1966 and it was the 
world's leader in construction of motorcycle. Sony was the world's largest company 
in audio and video equipment and Fujitsu was in the top three of the world's 
computer manufacturing (Toyo Keizai, 1999). 
As the table 8 shows, in all sectors, there is an increasing move by Japan's 
transnational towards overseas production. Since 1985, the overseas production has 
been multiplied by four. Indeed, between 1985 and 1995, the growth rate in Japan's 
28 
 
overseas production was twice that of both the United States and Germany. At the 
industry level, between 1992 and 1996, Japanese overseas production doubled in 
chemicals, industrial machinery, iron and steel and precision tools. The main sectors 
are electrical machinery (19.7%) and transport equipment (24.9%). 
 
Table 7: Japan's Top TNCs Ranked by Ownership of Foreign Assets (Billions 
of dollars and numbers of employees) 
    
Asset 
  Sales   
Global rank by foreign 
assets 
Corporation 
Industrial 
sector Foreign Total Foreign Total all tnc's 
by 
sector   
Toyota Automotive 41.8 105 50.4 88.5 6 3   
Nissan Motor Automotive 26.5 57.6 27.8 49.7 17 7   
Sony Corp. Electronics   48.2 40.3 51.1 21 2   
Mitsubishi 
Corp. 
Diversified 21.9 67.1 41.5 120.4 22 1 
  
Honda Motor Automotive 21.5 36.5 31.5 45.4 24 8   
Mitsui & Co 
Ltd 
Diversified 17.9 55.5 52.3 132.6 35 2 
  
Matsushita 
Elect. 
Electronics 12.2 62.7 23.6 59.7 55 6 
  
Hitachi Ltd. Electronics 12 76.6 19.8 63.8 56 7   
Fujitsu Ltd. Electronics 11.2 38.8 14.1 37.7 59 9   
Mitsubishi 
Motors 
Automotive 9.1 25.1 10.9 28.3 70 13 
  
Bridgestone Tyres 7.2 13.3 9.8 16.7 93 2   
Canon 
Electronics 
Electronics 7 22 14.6 21.2 96 11 
  
Toshiba Corp. Electronics 6.8 44.9 14.6 41.3 98 12   
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1999) 
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Table 8: Comparative Growth of Japanese Manufacturing Production 
Overseas Percentage of Domestic Production 
  1985 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Japan 100 206.7 246.7 286.7 300 386.7 433.3 
United 
States 
100 156.6 150.6 156.6 172.9    
Germany 100 109.6 128.3 138.5 141.6     
Comparative growth in overseas production  
All manufacturing (Index 1985 =100, all countries) 
Source: MITI (1998). 
 
2.4 An important role of the state  
Japan is a liberal state. However the State plays an important role. Its actions have 
helped initiate new industries, cushion the effects of economic depression, create a 
sound economic infrastructure, and protect the living standards of the citizen. It 
organizes and directs the Japanese economy toward the goals that seems to be the 
best. The State is thus on the origins of Japan's economic development with the 
desire of the state since MEIJI, to build a great power capable of escaping foreign 
domination. 
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The Ministry of Finance have played an important role, for instance in their 
targeting of investments funds. It establishes low interest rates and, by thus reducing 
the cost of investment funds to corporations, promotes industrial expansion. 
The Ministry of Transportation is responsible for supervision of all land, sea, and air 
transport. 
The Ministry of Construction is in charge of supervising all construction in Japan 
and Japanese construction abroad. Its responsibilities also include land acquisition 
for public use and environmental protection as it related to construction. 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare is responsible for supervising and coordinating 
all health and welfare services, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is 
responsible for the postal service and electronic communications. 
MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) plays a fundamental role in the 
economy. MITI‘s role has been especially strong in the shaping and directing of 
industrial policy, often in close consultation with private enterprise. 
It is responsible for the regulation of production and the distribution of goods and 
services. It develops plans concerning the structure of Japanese industry. MITI has 
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several special functions: controlling Japan's foreign trade and supervising 
international commerce; ensuring the flow of goods in the national economy; 
promoting the development of manufacturing, mining, and distribution industries; 
and supervising the procurement of a reliable supply of raw materials and energy 
resources. In terms of information it collects data on technology and foreign 
markets, translates it and provides a database to the companies. It defines the 
priority sectors, organizes the restructuring and mergers, facilitates the rapid 
adaptation of the Japanese economy and ensures the shift to high-tech activities. On 
the commercial side, it regulates the competition, sets standards. It contributes to the 
tremendous trade surplus. 
In the period directly following the war its aim was reconstruction and the 
achievement of economic independence. In recent years, MITI has become less 
interventionist and its policy focus has gradually changed to structural adjustment 
and technology policy (see also Okimoto, 1989). 
 
 
32 
 
2.5 Significant weight of foreign trade 
While in the 60s Japan had a deficit with most of its trading partners, it became the 
third commercial power of the world behind the U.S. and Germany with about 9% 
of global exports in the 80's. It has become more and more open, occupying an 
important position in international trade. Its economic power relies traditionally on 
the strength of its exports. Japan is the fourth country for its exports (after China, 
Germany and the United States) and the fifth for its imports (behind the United 
States, China, Germany and France).  
It is the second largest importer of raw materials and energy: oil, gas, coal, uranium, 
iron, bauxite, copper, wool. This represents 25% of its purchases. Suppliers: Saudi 
Arabia, Indonesia, China, Australia. It is the first world importer of food, including 
seafood, meat, wheat, corn (U.S. No. 1 supplier). Exports are machinery, vehicles 
and high tech. Automobiles (15% of exports absorbed by U.S. 45%), motorcycles, 
boats, office equipment, machine tools and electrical engineering and electronics are 
the most important positions. In heavy industries steel sales dominate. 
The main trading partners of Japan: 
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►The East Asia is the first outlet of the country (40 to 50% of sales). This shows 
the importance of the area for Japan. 
►The U.S. is another key trading partner of Japan (25 to 30% of exports). It is the 
American market which absorbs the bulk of Japanese industrial products. U.S. 
imports from Japan are concentrated within three main categories. The Japanese 
exportations to U.S. have consisted of passenger cars and parts; computers and 
components; office machinery parts; and electrical machinery (primarily video 
cameras). 
The economic policy of U.S. aimed to access Japan‘s markets. It consists of 
promoting two-way investment, stimulating domestic demand-led economic growth, 
promoting economic restructuring, improving the climate for U.S. investors, and 
raising the standard of living in both the United States and Japan. The U.S.-Japan 
bilateral economic relationship - based on enormous flows of trade, investment, and 
finance - is strong, mature, and increasingly interdependent. Japan is a major market 
for many U.S. products. The United States exports products including chemicals, 
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pharmaceuticals, films and music, commercial aircraft, nonferrous metals, plastics, 
and medical and scientific supplies. 
►In recent years Japan became more established in Europe with growing trade that 
is fast but still represents only 15%, Germany and the UK are first partners, while 
trade with France remains modest. 
Japan is beneficiary with almost all its partners. Only trade with oil producing 
countries is in deficit and some countries such as China. 
 
Table 9: Foreign trade statistics (In billions of dollars) 
Years Total Exports Total Imports 
1979 108.87 92.53 
1980 117.13 126.73 
1985 191.41 159.05 
1990 311.254 267.832 
1995 443.996 347.864 
2000 464.692 395.527 
2005 636.611 542.38 
2006 677.782 677.782 
2007 733.111 670.065 
2008 807.207 723.705 
2009 895.228 877.887 
Source: World Bank Indicator 
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In terms of trade as shown in table 9, Japan has recorded a trade surplus continually 
in recent years.  
 
2.6 A Country with Strong International Economic Relations 
Since the nineteenth century, Japan has a special place in international relations. 
Indeed, a long time influenced and subject to the Chinese empire by the system of 
tribute, Japan under the Meiji period will develop a new strategy in the region where 
the model is based on the development and Western modernization. In fact, after the 
Meiji Restoration (1868), the government and people fully recognized the 
importance of introducing the advanced civilization of the Western countries and 
developing international trade with them. 
Japan attaches importance to "economic diplomacy" (keizai Gaikou). That is to say 
that Japanese diplomacy considered important the development of foreign trade for 
economic recovery and economic independence. Diplomatic efforts have enabled 
Japan to achieve its accession to the OECD to participate in the system of the IMF 
and GATT, and finally to achieve accelerated economic growth. The GNP has 
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doubled in just over a luster and then continued to grow at a rate of 10% to 14% per 
annum until the late sixties. As the Japanese economy has risen to world leadership, 
foreign policy was based on the principles: respect of the United Nations, 
cooperation with the liberal countries and maintaining a strong position in Asia. 
Attaching importance to ASEAN as a regional system, Japan has begun to focus on 
regional cooperation with that organization. Japan has increasingly expanded its 
influence in Asia. By cooperating with the United States as a member of the 
developed countries, Japan has given full weight to opinions from Asia. 
ODA is a symbol of Japan's international contribution. The total official 
development assistance from Japan has increased dramatically from 1986 to 1988 
(34% annual average), and in 1989 Japan became in absolute value the first provider 
of official development assistance worldwide. 
With the rise of imperialism in the twentieth century, Japan was involved in several 
conflicts and is counted among the vanquished of World War II. Under the 
American protectorate, Japan will be frequently put to the test in an area that will 
have two major Communist powers: China and North Korea. Now threatened by the 
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nuclear ambitions of North Korea, and having latent conflicts with China, the 
country has deployed for the first time in 2009, a missile shield. 
 
2.7 A country with high rate of savings and investment 
One of the characteristics of the Japanese economy is the high rate of savings which 
supported the high rate of investment. Indeed, one key to Japan‘s successful 
economic performance has been its high rate of savings. The high savings have 
financed the high rate of investment which is the basic supporting factor for the 
economic growth of the 1950s, 1960s, and the early 1970s, and helped meet capital 
shortages abroad during the post-1973 era of stable growth. 
Japan's saving rate was one of the highest in the world. Table 10 shows the gross 
domestic savings as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It shows that 
the rate in the 70s, in the 80s and the early 90s had been higher than any other 
developed country. 
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For example in 1970, Japanese share of gross domestic saving in GDP, accounting 
for 40.36 percent, was higher than 18.39 percent for the United States, 21.13 percent 
for the United Kingdom and 26.69 percent for France. 
 
Investment has always played a central role in the Japanese economy. Its rate rose 
steadily, peaking in 1970s. In fact, as the table 11 shows, in 1970s and 1980s, Japan 
outran most of the developed countries. 
 
Table 10: Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
United States 18.39 18.42 19.79 17.54 16.31 16.86 16.71 14.14 12.47 
United 
Kingdom 
21.13 17.8 20.06 19.64 18.06 17.03 15.81 13.63 14.05 
Germany 29.03 21.06 20.51 19.50 23.09 22.69 22.12 22.17 24.92 
France 26.69 23.85 22.22 18.28 21.17 19.70 21.36 19.46 19.82 
Brazil 20.12 22.87 21.09 24.35 21.40 16.50 16.48 19.81 20.87 
Canada 24.06 23.22 24.83 23.23 21.04 21.95 25.98 25.79 24.68 
Belgium 30.24 25.32 21.81 18.79 24.67 24.55 25.42 25.77 24.88 
China 28.92 30.19 34.82 34.27 39.13 43.53 37.52 47.62 51.76 
Japan 40.36 32.87 31.41 31.75 33.66 29.74 26.89 24.95 23.75 
Korea, Rep. 15.16 20.15 23.90 30.55 36.43 36.57 33.41 32.38 30.03 
Thailand 21.16 22.12 22.88 25.51 33.83 35.35 31.46 30.32 31.47 
Australia 31.17 25.23 26.39 24.26 25.42 21.67 22.40 23.12 25.69 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
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Table 11: Investment (% of GDP) 
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 2008 
Australia 31.46 25.77 25.96 26.39 27.36 24.35 25.56 27.51 
Brazil 20.54 26.83 23.34 19.20 20.16 18.25 16.20 19.91 
Canada 21.51 24.97 22.98 20.91 20.91 20.23 22.07 23.13 
China 29.02 30.16 35.19 38.34 36.14 35.11 42.09 44.04 
France 26.45 23.22 24.20 19.22 22.52 20.46 20.32 22.04 
United 
Kingdom 
20.09 19.25 17.59 18.24 20.18 17.65 17.05 16.65 
Japan 39.12 32.86 32.32 28.36 32.72 25.43 23.56 23.60 
Thailand 25.57 26.73 29.14 28.24 41.35 22.83 31.44 28.87 
United States 18.01 17.43 20.26 20.29 17.66 20.57 19.88 17.42 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Japan has experienced in recent decades a major economic development, which 
began really in the 1950s. Indeed, the pre-war nation experience has provided 
several important legacies. On the one hand, the Tokugawa period (1600-1867) 
which bequeathed a commercial sector to burgeoning urban centers, a relatively 
well-educated elite, a productive agriculture, a nation closely united with a 
marketing and financial systems highly developed, and national infrastructure roads 
and, on the other hand, the development of the industry during the Meiji period to 
such an extent that Japan could fight for world power, were important prelude to the 
post-war growth. Moreover, the level of investment was very high and that until the 
80s. The investment in capital which averaged more than 11% of GNP during the 
prewar period has risen about 20% of GNP in the 50s and more than 30% by the late 
60 and 70s. During the economic boom of the late 1980s, the rate was still hovering 
around 20%. Japanese firms have imported the latest technology to develop the 
industrial base. In the 70s and 80s, Japan has improved its industrial base through 
authorization technology, procurement of patents, and imitation and improvement of 
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foreign inventions. In the 80s, the industry has intensified its research and 
development, and many companies have become famous for their innovation and 
creativity. 
During the decades 60, 70 and 80, the Japanese growth reached almost the double 
what was observed at this time in Europe or in the United States. The market share 
of Japan in the world trade rose from 1.8% in 1953 to 10% forty years later, making 
the country the second largest commercial power, behind the United States, at a 
level substantially identical to that of Germany. However, the too expansive 
management of the economic policy by the Japanese authorities (rates too low, too 
high deficits while growth was sustained) led to the formation of a bubble in asset 
prices. The explosion of the bubble in the early 90s marked the end of one era and 
the beginning of a period that was later dubbed "the lost decade." This name has its 
origins in the too slow response of public authorities to the crisis. The establishment 
of an expansive fiscal policy, the fall in rates, the launch of a non-conventional 
monetary policy to thwart the emergence of a liquidity trap, the support to the 
banking sector arrived whenever too late or at the wrong moment. In these 
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circumstances, Japan experienced a period of extremely low growth marked by a 
complete shutdown of the engine of credit and debt reduction in the private sector 
that the public sector tried to curb by increasing massively its deficit. The measures 
taken however proved to be ineffective, failing to restart the economic machine and 
stop the deflation. 
In this chapter, we will do an analysis of Japan's economic growth in two sections. 
The first section analyzes the economic growth in postwar Japan and the second 
analyzes the recession of the Japanese economy during the period 1990-2009. 
 
3.1 The economic growth in postwar Japan  
There is a clear demarcation in the growth trend before and after the year 1973. The 
period from the end of the World War II until 1973 is known as the rapid growth era 
with real GDP per capita rising at 8 per cent annually on average, while the period 
after this year until 1990 can be designated as the ―slow growth era‖ with real GDP 
per capita rising at about 4 per cent annually. In this section, we will be, in a first 
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time concerned with the basics of the Japanese growth model and in a second time 
we will analyze the different periods of growth. 
 
3.1.1 Basics of the Japanese growth model 
●An interventionist state 
The state invests in the areas it considers vital to guarantee the national 
independence. Despite its limited resources, it curries out or subsidizes the necessary 
infrastructure for communications, intervenes directly in the extraction of raw 
materials and creates large pole of heavy industry (steel company Yahata). But these 
expenses dig the public deficit. The state then gives its companies to private 
individuals or companies from 1880. Abandoning its role as an entrepreneur, it 
practices a supple guiding of the economy, based on close ties of public-private 
cooperation. 
In the mid '50s, the state intervention is no longer intended to finance the economy, 
but it coordinates the private action, especially concerning economic policy 
(investment, industrial strategies). 
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MITI: Ministry of Industry and Commerce, founded in 1949, plays a key role. 
It controls the action of public banks, which help finance investment in the industry; 
it intervenes in the direction of investment and in the definition of key industries, 
priority, or in restructuring. 
This collaboration between state and private firms has been made in the goal of a 
strong industrial growth, sometimes to the detriment of other aspects of development 
(standard of living of households, purchasing power, housing conditions, and 
pollution on the environment). 
 ●A dual economy 
What characterized the prewar Japanese economy is reflected even more 
pronounced after the war: 
► On the one hand, a modern sector composed of large firms that play an increasing 
role in global markets. 
► On the other hand, a traditional sector composed of small businesses, artisans, 
workers that use little capital but a cheap workforce. This traditional sector is bound 
by traditional outsourcing contracts with large firms. 
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Small businesses are numerous in traditional industry (silk, toys), but there are also 
small modern enterprises (high growth global markets) that subcontract for large 
groups. 
It is this second sector that absorbs the surplus of the cheap labor and which in times 
of difficulty, supports economic shocks (such as firing or retaining workers without 
paying them, or by reducing wages). 
One finds this dualism in the statutes of workers: 
There is a primary labor market with stable employment ("Lifetime"), wages that 
increase with seniority (that keeps the workforce) in large firms. 
A second labor market, more subject to market forces, more flexible, formed by 
employees of small businesses, women, older workers. 
The disposal of mines and enterprises also promotes the concentration of the 
economic activity. In the absence of a capital market, it is the financiers who acquire 
public goods. Among these groups are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, 
who have built their financial power on international trade, through their powerful 
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sôgô shôsha
1
. The state encourages their concentration by facilitating mergers and 
giving them a privileged access to the bank credit. From the 1920s, these groups 
become zaibatsu
2
, diversified conglomerate concentrating the industrial potential of 
the country. Early in the twentieth century are already in place the principles of the 
dual economy, so characteristic of Japan: on the one hand, conglomerates closely 
related to banks, dominant industrially and endowed with sôgô shôsha, providing 
the commercial interface upstream  (purchase of raw materials) and downstream 
(marketing of product) of the production; on the other hand, an armada of small and 
medium enterprises, the more often subcontractors of the zaibatsu, which play the 
role of  safety valve during economic downturns. 
●A highly regulated financial system 
                                               
1 Major trading companies, in the heart of conglomerates, providing today three main functions: trade 
intermediation function in the export, function of information (with an extensive network of business 
intelligence and technology abroad) and financial intermediation function (trade credits for exports). 
2 Literally, it is a "financial clique."Pejorative word designating Japanese oligopolies (Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda), family groups controlling, through a Honsha (holding), a series of 
companies linked by crossed participations (each company holds shares of other companies of the 
group). 
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The financial system which has been established in the Meiji period also aims to 
ensure a tight state control over industrial development. Instead of encouraging the 
emergence of stock markets as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the choice falls on 
credit bank as the main source of financing the corporate. This allows the state to 
better control the flow of the financial supplies towards the industry, rather than 
leaving the initiative to shareholders. Japanese banks are able to supply cheap credit 
thanks to abundant savings maintained at very low rates. The State looks after the 
proper functioning of the device by strong savings incentives (promotion of the 
virtues of frugality to the households) and by controlling the allocation of credit to 
industries that it intends to develop.  
●The role of savings and investment 
The takeoff of the Japanese economy in late 19th century is characterized by a high 
savings rate, which contributes to play an important role in financing the 
development after the war. National savings has essentially financed the growth.  
Over the years, savings are also favored by real estate, high land prices in urban 
areas, to access the property. These savings help to finance business investment.  
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It was a factor of power of using these savings, but the loans from banks have been a 
factor of fragility in the sense that private firms might know too much debt, leading 
to change the orientation of the investment. But, the central bank guaranteed the 
repayment of debts of priority, which encouraged them to take risks.  
The investment rate (GFCF / GDP) in Japan is the highest among industrialized 
countries; it reached in the early 70s up to 35%. 
This increase of the investment is accompanied by very rapid productivity growth: 
Between 55 and 70, the hourly labor productivity increased by 8% annual rate. 
It is the link to this very high rate of investment which permits to modernize 
industrial equipment and to substitute capital for labor. 
●Post-war Economic Reforms 
To revive the economy and democratize the country several reforms have been 
imposed. 
Agricultural reform (1945): The American occupation authorities imposed a major 
agrarian reform because they believe that the misery of the peasant population and 
lack of land had favored the war and the logic of territorial expansion. Thus, as soon 
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as 1945, changes were noted on the agricultural system with a redistribution of land 
for the benefit of micro-property. The agrarian reform promulgated in 1946 has been 
implemented from 1947 to 1949. 
Labor market reform (1945): Americans realize that Japanese workers have very 
little bargaining power, which is explained historically by the importance of 
hierarchical relationships. They reform by imposing a collective bargaining, the 
right to strike (that the Japanese use very quickly), and social protective regulations 
(working hours, paid leave). 
Zaibatsu dissolution (1945): It is these companies that drove economic 
development during the Meiji era and after the First World War I. Under the 
instigation of the American, upheavals have been noted in the industrial system with 
a legislation inspired from U.S. antitrust laws and the dissolution of zaibatsui. 
It should also be noted that a policy of financial stabilization with the "Dodge Plan"
3
 
adopted in 1949 stabilized the Japanese currency. The technical and financial 
                                               
3 Dodge Plan in 1949 is to rebalance the budget, curb loans to rebuild and restore stability in the yen. 
We return to relative stability in prices, slow inflation without actually hindering the economic 
recovery, driven by mechanisms that are similar to the Marshall Plan. 
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assistance of the United States with a large workforce, skilled, and low wages have 
helped establish an audacious economic policy to help restart the economy. 
 
3.1.2 The factors of the high economic growth of Japan 
 From 1950 to 1955 
This period corresponds to the Korean War. It resulted in high military demand and 
triggered rapid reconstruction of the Japanese economy. The purchase of strategic 
materials by the U.S. has increased very rapidly. Many companies enjoyed the US 
military procurement boom and accumulated profits. The total sum of special 
procurements for the Korean War from 1950 to 1955 amounted to $3.55 billion. 
This was about 44% of foreign currency received by Japan as payment for exported 
goods. By 1952, Japan restored the real GDP level to a level comparable with that of 
1935. After the Korean War ended (1950-1953), the Japanese economy fully 
benefited from the sustained development of the world economy. 
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Most researchers agree that the postwar Japanese economic development started 
from 1955, in which year the economy restored the pre-war peak level of 
production. 
The era of high economic growth: 1955-73 
During that period the Japanese economy had grown rapidly. It was during this 
period, that Japan catches up most of Western countries, and as early as 1968, the 
Japanese economy became the second largest economy in the capitalist world, as 
measured by GNP, after the United States of America. The high and rapid growth of 
the economy in this period changed various features of Japanese society. In the 
1960's, the average real growth rate of the Japanese economy was more than 10%. 
This figure is far higher than that of any of the western countries. 
We now turn to the explanation of the causes of the rapid economic growth during 
this period. 
 In his work, the Japanese economy, Mitsuo Saito found that the private 
consumption, government consumption, gross investment, exports and imports are 
the causes of this economic performance. Indeed, According to a growth accounting 
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analysis on the demand side, he found, out of 9.7% of GDP growth in the period 
1960-73, the contribution of the private consumption, government consumption,  
gross investment, exports and imports are respectively 5.7%, 0.7%, 4.0%, 0.9%, -
1.5% (see table 12). On the supply side he explained the high economic growth by 
the contribution of three interrelated factors; labor, capital, and technology. 
Aggregate demand factors of the economy, huge demands from an increasing 
number of populations in Japan and export to foreign countries supported the rapid 
economic growth. Table 13 shows the contribution of each factor to the 9.6% of 
GDP growth rate. With 3.4%, the contribution of private capital stock was higher 
than that of labor, 1%, and that of public capital stock, 0.4%, indicating that during 
the 1960s the rapid growth of private capital propelled the economy with great vigor 
on the supply side as well as on the demand side. The contribution of the technical 
progress which was 4.8% was very high and was about one-half of the GDP growth 
rate. 
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Table 12: The analysis of real GDP growth, 1960-1973, by the growth 
accounting method 
  Private Government Gross       
  consumption  consumption Investment Exports Imports 
Total 
GDP 
Share of 
Component in 
GDP growth (%) 
58 7 41 9 -15 100 
Contribution of 
component to 
GDP growth (%) 
5.7 0.7 4 0.9 -1.5 9.7 
Growth rate of a 
component (%) 
8.9 4.9 14.9 14 14.9 9.6 
Source: Mitsuo Saito (2000):  the Japanese economy, p.61 
 
Table 13: The analysis of real GDP growth, 1960-1973, by the growth 
accounting method for the supply side 
    
Private 
Capital 
Public 
Capital Technical Total 
  Labor Stock Stock Progress GDP 
Share of component in GDP growth 
(%) 
10 35 4 50 100 
Contribution of each component 1 3.4 0.4 4.8 9.6 
To GDP growth (%) 
Growth rate of each factor 1.7 8.6 12 4.8   
Source: Mitsuo Saito (2000):  the Japanese economy, p.61 
Edward Denison and William Chung, also, in their work for Asia’s New Giant, 
found that increased labor, increased capital stock, advances in knowledge 
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contributed more to growth. Other factors they found are reallocation of resources 
away from agriculture, and economies of scale. As the table 14 shows, labor, 
capital, and changes in productivity contributed respectively 1.85, 2.10, and 4.82 to 
the 8.77 percent average annual rise in real national income. Thus these three factors 
accounted for more than half of the economic growth. Contributing for 1.97 
percentage points, the technological change was the most important source of 
productivity change. Just slightly less important were economies of scale, 
representing the ability of industry to attain more efficient size as the Japanese 
market grew. Improved resource allocation, mainly the movement of resources out 
of agriculture, contributed another 0.95 percentage point to growth. 
In his explanation of the Factors in the High Rate of Growth of Japan, Miyohei 
SHINOHARA, in his work, ―Factors in Japan‘s Economic Growth‖, distinguished 
two kinds of factors: the postwar factors and the long-term factors. 
Among the postwar factors identified by shinohara we can cite: 
●Sharp decrease of military expenditures: Indeed, after the war, the proportion of 
military expenditures decreased greatly. According to the national income statistic the 
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defense expenditures which amounted to 157.7 billion yen, represented only 5.9 per 
cent of 2,683 billion yen spent by the Government on goods and services in 1960. We 
can consider that the difference was employed for investment, thus accelerating the 
economic growth. 
●Technological innovation 
In the years 1956-1961, there was an important progress in technological innovation. 
It played an important role in quickening the pace of economic growth. Indeed, there 
is no gainsaying the facts that the massive introduction in a short period of 
technology from abroad has contributed to the faster growth since 1956. 
●Labor force: The rate of increase in labor force is related with that of gross 
national product. The high rate of increase in the labor force has contributed to the 
high rate of Japanese economic growth. 
The others postwar factors are Government's role, Roles of labor unions, land reform 
and inflation. 
The Long-term factors are: 
56 
 
Financial structure and investment behavior: the entrepreneurs' strong interest in 
investment has contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese economy attained in 
the postwar period.  
The others Long-term factors are the role of small-and-medium enterprises, the 
saving ratio, the dual structure and export growth potential. 
According to Saburo OKITA in his work, ―economic growth of postwar Japan‖, 
nine factors are primarily held responsible for the high rate of growth of Japanese 
economy and are: 
The postwar recovery factors which involved: strong desire for rehabilitation; 
abundance of under-utilized high quality technicians and labor; backlog of purchasing 
power accumulated during the war; low capital output ratio. 
●Technological innovations: the technological innovations acted as important stimuli 
and have greatly influenced the course of Japan's economic growth in the postwar 
economy of Japan.  
●Reduction in military expenditures: the decrease in unproductive military 
expenditure has been an important factor of the high postwar rate of growth. 
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Increase in the rate of investment: The high rate of investment contributed for 
maintaining a high rate of growth of Japan. 
●Abundant supply of labor: The abundant labor force had a favorable impact on the 
high rate of growth of Japan. 
●Increase in supply of capital goods from domestic sources: the modernization of the 
industrial structure, especially, the expansion of capital goods production has been 
one of the most important factors of the Japanese growth. 
The other factors are smaller business fluctuations, Institutional factors, and favorable 
international environment. 
Although the Japanese rapid economic growth was achieved primarily by labor, 
capital, and technical progress, this is not to say that the economic policies and 
planning had no role in the process. The Japanese policy-making authorities played 
a major role in the economic development. The main policies were those of Yoshida 
and Ikeda. 
The policy called the Yoshida Doctrine shaped the postwar economy of Japan. The 
policy was aimed to set economic reconstruction and development. Prime Minister 
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Yoshida Shigeru called the father of modern Japanese economy developed this 
policy during the early period of the Korean War. All forces have been concentrated 
on the reconstruction of the economy while saving the military expenditures and 
leaving the defense to the U.S. Army. 
In addition to the Yoshida Doctrine, Ikeda, who is seen to be the most important 
figure in Japan's rapid growth has implemented policies that contributed greatly to 
the later Japan's rapid economic performance with an average growth rate of 10.8 
percent in the late 1960s and drove the economy to become the second largest in the 
world by the year 1968. The Yoshida‘s plan was aimed to double the income earned 
by the Japanese workers and set a high living standard from the period of 1961 to 
1970 by greatly increasing the amount of investments made by the central 
government to both private and public firms. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was another political factor 
that greatly influenced the growth and was mostly responsible for the industrial 
growth in Japan. 
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Table 14: Sources of growth in Japan, 1953-71 (percent) 
 
Sources Contribution to Growth 
National income growth rate 8.77 
Labor 1.85 
    Employment 1.14 
    Hours 0.21 
    Age-sex composition 0.14 
    Education 0.34 
    Unallocated 0.02 
Capital 2.1 
     Inventories 0.73 
    Nonresidential structures and equipment 1.07 
     Dwellings 0.3 
     International assets 0 
Land 0 
Productivity change 4.82 
       Advances in knowledge  1.97 
     Improved resource allocation 0.95 
     Economies of scale 1.94 
     Irregular factors -0.04 
Source: Hugh Patrick and henry Rosovsky (eds), Asia’s New Giant: How the Japanese          
Economy Works (Brooking, 1976), p.94 
 
The era of rapid economic growth ended in the early 1970s, when Japan's economy 
underwent a sudden slowdown due to two external events. In 1971 the United States 
abandoned the system of fixed foreign exchange rates that had been in place since 
World War II. This change caused the value of the yen to rise, and consequently, 
Japanese exports fell. 
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In 1973 an increase in crude oil prices caused recessions in countries around the 
world; in Japan it causes panic among the consumers who feared shortages and price 
increases, inflation, and a sudden slowdown in the growth rate. 
 
The era of slower growth: 1974 to 1990 
After becoming the second economy in the world with strong economic growth in 
the 1960s, Japan despite the disappointing performance of 1974-1975 and 1980 due 
to oil price shocks has managed to maintain a relatively high growth and that until 
1990. Indeed, the oil crisis in 1973 had an enormous effect on the Japanese economy 
since Japan had depended on the supply of oil for driving its economic growth. The 
Inflation soared in the economy and unemployment problem arose, causing Japan to 
go into a recession for a short period of time. However, the Japanese government by 
its tight money policies achieved successful recovery.  
The economy after the oil crisis stabilized due to government's quick response and 
high technological level already achieved. Average annual growth for the period was 
about 4 percent which was less than half the rate that prevailed in the previous 
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twenty years. So, this period is called in Japan the era of stable growth. This is a 
highly inappropriate term in two senses. First, there was nothing unstable about the 
high-growth era; it was unusually high. Second, ―stable‖ could be taken to mean 
steadier, but growth between 1974 and 1984 was not particularly steady.  
As the table 15 shows all three factors, labor service input growth, capital service 
input growth and total factor productivity (TFP) growth contributed weakly to the 
growth. Among the three factors, the decline in capital service input growth is the 
largest and appears to be the main cause of the low growth during this period.  
The key to recovery was the boom in exports of cars, electronics, and other 
products, which grew far more rapidly than imports. The contribution of exports to 
the economic growth during this period was very important. The table 16 shows that 
since 1974 the share of growth due the expansion of net exports of goods and 
services has often been high. In fact, the net exports expansion contributed 38 
percent of all growth in the economy between 1980 and 1985. 
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Table 15:  GDP growth and its decomposition for the Japanese 
economy 
  1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 
Real GDP Growth 5.69% 3.92% 4.91% 
           Contribution of Labor Service   
 
  
           Input Growth 1.35% 0.81% 0.68% 
Contribution of Man-hour     
 
  
                    Growth 0.87% 0.31% 0.38% 
                    Contribution of labor quality   
 
  
                    Growth 0.48% 0.51% 0.30% 
            Contribution of Capital Service      
            Input Growth 1.98% 2.12% 2.46% 
                    Contribution of Capital      
                    Quantity Growth 2.06% 1.72% 1.87% 
                    Contribution of Capital         
                    Quality Growth -0.08% 0.40% 0.59% 
            TFP Growth of the Whole      
            Economy 2.37% 0.98% 1.77% 
           TFP Growth of the Manufacturing  Sector 1.13% 1.25% 1.01% 
           TFP Growth of the Nonmanufacturing Sector   0.74% -0.11% 0.80% 
Source: K. Fukao, S. Hamagata, T. Inui, K. Ito, H. U. Kwon, T. Makino, T. Miyagawa, Y. Nakanishi, 
and J. Tokui, ―Estimation Procedures and TFP Analysis of the JIP Database 2006 Provisional 
Version,‖ paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of the EU KLEMS Consortium, May 17-9, 2006, 
Valencia. 
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Table 16: Contribution to GDP 
    Percentage points of GNP 
Share of GNP growth 
due  
Year 
GNP Growth 
rate  Growth due to net export to net exports 
1973 7.9 -3 -27.5 
1974 -1.4 1.2 …. 
1975 2.7 1.9 71.1 
1976 4.8 1 20.9 
1977 5.3 0.9 16.9 
1978 5.2 -0.9 -14.8 
1979 5.3 -1.4 -20.9 
1980 4.3 3.4 79.8 
1981 3.7 1.5 40.9 
1982 3.1 0.3 9.7 
1983 3.2 1.5 46.3 
1984 5.1 1.3 25.7 
1985 4.7 1 21.2 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1987 (Tokyo: EPA, 
1987), pp. 118-121. 
 
3.2 The recession of the Japanese economy (1990-2009) 
Thus, throughout the 1990's, the Japanese economy has been preyed to a number of 
economic crises. The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP was 0.5 percent 
in the period 1991-2000. Many economists have tried to explain the crisis with the 
standard tools of economic analysis. There are several factors that have been cited 
by economist analyst to explain the Japanese slowdown.  
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In this section we will emphasize on the financial crisis, the yen appreciation, the 
liquidity trap and the inadequate policy responses to explain the extended slump in 
Japanese economic activity over the 1990s. 
 
3.2.1 Growth affected by financial crises in the 1990s 
GDP growth in Japan was marked by serious financial crises in the 1990s, as shown 
in the figure 2 below. Indeed, during the 1990s, Japan experienced an 
unprecedented a triple crisis, stock market, real estate, and banking. The origin of 
the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s is a period of cost of capital and interest 
rates abnormally low. During the years 1985-1989, have been combined the sharp 
appreciation of yen after the Plaza agreements
4
, a flexible monetary policy, the rise 
of the stock market, a boom in investment and rising of land prices. Nikkei Average 
index of stock prices tripled in value from 1985 to the end of 1989, as shown in 
                                               
4 The Plaza agreements are agreements on the exchange rate signed on 22 September 1985 between 
the United States, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and France. These countries agreed to 
intervene on the foreign exchange market to depreciate the U.S. dollar against the yen and the 
Deutsche Mark.  
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Figure 3.  And as can be seen from Figure 4, urban real estate prices in Japan's six 
largest cities tripled between 1985 and 1991. 
The rising of the prices of stock and real estate has seemingly strengthened the 
soundness of the corporate balance sheets and, mostly, the banks. So, companies 
have been heavily indebted, acquiring real estate and financial assets through access 
to credit virtually unlimited and very inexpensive. Hence, the swelling of a bubble 
of over-investment and, a weakening structure of corporate balance sheets. Facing 
the bubble in asset prices, the government responded by tightening monetary policy 
raising interest rate from 2.5% in April 1989 to 6% in August 1990. After the 
increase, the market collapsed. The Nikkei stock market index fell more than 60 
percent—from a high of 40,000 at the end of 1989 to under 15,000 by 1992.  
Alan D. Brunner and Steven B. Kamin in their in work, ―Determinants of the 
1991-93 Japanese recession: evidence from a structural model of the Japanese 
economy‖ showed that shocks to asset prices (land and stock values) consistently 
depressed the output. They conclude that the collapse of asset price was an 
important factor in the recession. 
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Real estate prices also plummeted during the recession—by 80 percent from 1991 to 
1998 (Herbener 1999). 
Thus, from 1990 to 2002, GDP growth was around 1.5% on average, whereas it had 
been about 4% over the previous decade. The triple crisis - stock market, real estate, 
banking - has led to the "lost decade", during which have increased corporate 
bankruptcies and banking difficulties. The deteriorating labor market and deflation 
(underlying negative inflation from 1999) have maintained the weakness of 
domestic demand and increased the real burden of debt. 
 In addition, played a significant appreciation of the yen (1990-1995) and external 
shocks (1997-98: Asian crisis; 2001: Internet bubble burst). The country has 
experienced negative growth in 1998, when the Asian financial crisis occurred. 
Indeed, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, has led to the bankruptcy of prestigious 
financial institutions (among the largest banks: Hokkaido Takushoku, in 1997, Long 
Term Credit Bank and Japan Credit Bank in 1998) and causes a decline in GDP by 
1.8% in 1998.  
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Figure 2: GDP growth of Japan (in %) 
 
 
Figure 3: Nikkei 225 Stock Index Average (Yen) 
 
Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha (Japan Economic Journal) 
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Figure 4: Urban Land Price Index (1982=100) 
 
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute. 
In brief, as it can be seen in the table 15 and figure 6 below, the poor results in the 
1990s have been due to a combination of factors including low investment, 
gloominess of consumption, drop in exports and poor economic management. 
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Table 17: comparison of the average annual growth of GDP and its 
components by sub-periods 
 GDP Private 
consumption 
Housing 
investment 
companies 
Investment 
Public 
demand 
Exports Imports 
1980-1990 3,8% 3,5% 2,7% 7,3% 2,5% 4,7% 6,6% 
1990-2003 1,5% 1,5% –2,2% 0,6% 2,1% 4,2% 3,2% 
1998-2003 0,9% 0,8% –2,1% 0,7% 0,8% 4,2% 2,8% 
Source: ESRI 
Figure 5: Japanese exports, investment and consumption 
(Through the year) 
 
Source: CEIC database. 
With the exception of Japan, in the mid-1990s, all developed countries that 
experienced a banking crisis in the early 1990's come out of it, after taking 
appropriate measures, that are the "socialization of losses "and restructuring imposed 
70 
 
by the state. The amount mobilized was significant: more than 10% of GDP in 
Finland, 8% in the United States, 5% in France and Sweden.  
The fact that the financial crisis in Japan lasted come from a double phenomenon. 
Firstly, the crisis arose from a stock market crash and real estate more important 
than in other countries. Second, unlike other countries, Japan has long delayed 
restructuring of the banking system, which was done under the leadership of the 
State, from 1998. 
3.2.2 Growth affected by the appreciation of yen  
The rising value of the yen is blamed for Japan's recession. It is said that an 
appreciated yen reduces the competitiveness of export goods in overseas markets, 
thereby decreases the overall exports. 
Alan D. Brunner and Steven B. Kamin showed that during the recession 1991-93, 
unpredictable movements in exchange rate played an important role in accentuating 
the downturn. During this period the appreciation of yen has led the drop in 
contribution of the exportations. 
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Tamim Bayoumi by using a VAR model found that a 10 percent increase in the real 
exchange rate lowered the output by about 0.2 percent, reflecting the relatively closed 
nature of the Japanese economy. 
 
By the 1992 the effects of yen appreciation became so strong that net exports began 
contracting, constituting a drag on the economy.  
After a decline of the yen against the dollar since 2001, it has been observed a sharp 
rise from the mid-2008. The yen has appreciated 15% against the dollar from the 
Lehman Brother, September 15, 2008, and mid-February 2009. Thus, the exports 
have dropped by 27% in November 2008, 35% in December, 45.7% in January 2009 
and 49.4% in February, the biggest drop since 1980.  
Figure 6: Evolution of the dollar / yen 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
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3.2.3 Growth affected by the liquidity trap 
An alternative view, which focuses on monetary policy, holds that Japan was stuck 
in a liquidity trap (Krugman, 1998). 
The liquidity trap is a situation where the elasticity of money demand is very large: a 
change in interest rates implies a significant change in money demand. This 
situation is likely to occur when the interest rate is low (between 0 and 1%). Indeed, 
when the prevailing interest rate is low, economic agents know the interest rate will 
not fall much more and the probability that the rate rises is high. Therefore, they 
prefer to hold money rather than bonds. The price of these varies inversely with 
interest rates. If the interest rate rises, then bond prices fall. Capital losses are likely 
when the interest rate is low. The more this rate approaches zero the more the 
preference of money to the detriment of bonds. 
In Japan the Monetary policy were impotent to stimulate demand and raise spending 
since interest rates were already at the lowest point possible, no one would normally 
be willing to hold bonds with negative yields over (zero interest-bearing) money. 
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In this context, the weakness of the investment is due to very low capital return, 
taking account in particular of the indebtedness of companies: this could explain 
their inability to respond to low interest rates since 1992. One solution in principle 
would be to impose negative interest rates, and then the problem is that no agent 
would buy bonds that paid less than deposits without interest or assets in cash. The 
solution would be to get by monetary policy increasing inflationary expectations, 
implying negative real interest rate ex post. There would be a transfer of the excess 
of savings on the consumption and investment, and reactivated, allowing a 
resumption of Keynesian demand and return of the economy to full employment 
capacity. 
Paul Krugman (1999) argues that ―Japan's huge productive capacity remains 
unused because consumers and businesses just don't spend enough‖ (Krugman, 
1999:2). He underlines the issues of liquidity trap. The low interest rates combined 
with declining birth rates and lack of immigration brings the prospects of lower 
expected returns on capital. 
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All these have reduced investment demands, while crisis deepening forced 
households to save more. Krugman suggests that it should supplement deficits 
spending with an aggressive monetary policy and the Bank of Japan should both 
pump money into markets to undermine deflation, which will bring some inflation 
(Krugman, 1999:2). Krugman has borrowed the concept of Keynes called liquidity 
trap, a situation in which interest rates has fallen to certain level when liquidity-
preference may become crucial in the sense that households prefers cash to holding 
a debt which yields  low interest rates. 
 
3.2.4 Growth affected by inadequate policy responses 
The managing of the consequences of the bursting of the economic bubble has 
severely shaken the Japanese economic growth. Indeed, the attitude of the Japanese 
authorities against the general crisis of solvency of the banking system is at the heart 
of this long recession. 
 Following the collapse of the stock market, the government does not respond 
immediately. In 1991, the Bank of Japan began to lower its rates. Investors can then 
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borrow money at a rate approaching 6%. Between 1991 and 1995 it reduced its rate 
by 1 point per year on average, but that was not enough to save the Japanese 
economic system. Given the risks of bankruptcy the central bank should put the 
hand in pocket to recapitalize some banks. In the mid of the 1990s, the Bank of 
Japan injected 200 billion yen in the banking system, created to take over the debt of 
the real estate societies of credit. Despite the government efforts, bankruptcies and 
deflation (decline of the price index) continued. In 1995, the rate of the central bank 
has lowered significantly to 0.5%. But the crisis of 1998 reveals the extreme 
fragility of any bank intermediation. It intervenes as a warning to the authorities and 
banks, showing how the banking system, asphyxiated by its losses, depends on the 
supply, unconditional and cheap, liquidity from the central bank. Forced to see that 
the situation does not improve, the officials of the central bank took the decision 
from 1999, to practice the policy of zero rates, defusing thus the risk of systematic 
crisis.  
Given the depth of the banking crisis, the Bank of Japan responded late and too 
cautiously. It has underestimated the recessive and deflationary risks. In these 
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circumstances, the monetary policy has proved to be ineffective to revive the 
economy and counter the deflation. On the one hand, between 1991 and 1993, the 
impact in real terms of the drop in rate has been attenuated with disinflation. On the 
other hand, to avoid further risk-taking and considering their very poor balance sheet 
situation, the banks have less and less used the liquidity provided by the central bank 
to meet the demand for the credit which, be that as it may, remained low: either they 
retrocede it to them, or they placed it in treasury securities. Ultimately, the liquidity 
that the bank of Japan has injected generously to rate zero were mainly recycled in 
the form of government bonds, which remuneration was small. This phenomenon of 
the private sector eviction drives the economy into a vicious circle: the credit 
channels are frozen, the recession worsens generating a flow of new bad debts. The 
situation of liquidity was thus formed: the massive supply of liquidity at no cost by 
the central bank has no effect on the level of the activity and prices, ultimately 
making monetary policy ineffective. 
The table 18 below shows the macroeconomic situation of Japan during that time.  
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Table 18: Macroeconomic Data 
 GDP growth 
rate percent 
Discount Rate 
Percent 
Consumer 
Price Index 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1985 6.40 5 87.40 2.6 
1986 4.44 3 88.00 2.8 
1987 4.18 2.50 88.11 2.8 
1988 6.76 2.50 88.71 2.5 
1989 7 4.25 90.72 2.3 
1990 7.31 6.00 93.41 2.1 
1991 5.80 4.50 96.52 2.1 
1992 2.56 3.25 98.21 2.2 
1993 1 1.75 99.00 2.5 
1994 1.10 1.75 100 2.9 
1995 1.20 0.50 100 3.2 
1996 2.55 0.50 100 3.4 
1997 2.12 0.50 102 3.4 
1998 -1.17 0.50 102.5 4.1 
1999 -0.64 0.50 102 4.7 
2000 -0.14 0.50 101.5 4.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001 
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CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Several factors are identified by economists as the determinants of long-term 
economic growth. The question is what are the forces of economic growth and how 
can public policy enhance it? According to Adam Smith the forces of growth were 
released by freeing market agents from external restrictions. For him development 
would be spurred by the increasing size of markets, as well as increasing returns and 
externalities due to a rising division of labor. David Ricardo early in the nineteenth 
century emphasized investment in machinery as a cause of the increase in per capita 
income. Also for Karl Marx investment in machinery and capital accumulation are 
the major sources of growth. John Stuart Mill, by contrast, emphasized on education 
and the sciences as engines of growth. Schumpeter (1935) in particular perceived 
economic growth as a process of "creative destruction" in which some actors gain and 
others lose. 
The problematic of growth disappears from the scene for a long period where the 
allocation of resources (and not their creation) becomes the principal object of 
curiosity of economists (Walras, Keynes, Debreu ...). 
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The pioneering work of Ramsey (a dynamic general equilibrium model, 1928) has in 
fact remained unknown until the year 1960. The issue of growth has been revived 
later, with the work of Keynesian Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). But the revival 
has really happened following two articles published by Robert Solow (1956). 
After having disappeared in the 1970s, there was a resurgence of theories of 
economic growth in the 1980 following the works of Paul Romer and Robert Lucas. 
These works had put the role of "ideas" and human capital in the heart of the issue of 
growth: The endogenous growth theory. This approach has been accompanied by 
numerous empirical studies seeking to evaluate the importance of these factors.  
Economists are also increasingly focusing on financial intermediation, openness to 
trade, foreign investment, stability (instability) macroeconomic and sociopolitical.  
This literature review focuses on two points: the first deals with the theoretical 
analysis and the second with the empirical studies. 
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4.1 Theoretical analysis on the factors of economic growth 
Understand the sources of growth, work begun by the pioneer Robert Solow (1957), 
relayed by E. Denison (1967) and D. Jorgenson (1980), is now a common practice to 
quantify the major factors of growth. And that's in this quest that the concern to 
understand its determinants and interactions is born. 
In his founder article of 1956, which earned him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1987, Robert Solow demonstrates how the growth of capital stock, growth in the 
labor force and especially the technical progress affect the level of production and 
growth in time. In his model, growth in capital stock is financed by savings in a 
vision now dated financial system. The growth of the labor force is determined by 
demographic reasons. Technical progress is a way of reallocation of labor and 
capital.  The stock of capital is the essential determinant of the function of 
production. It rises through investment. It diminishes naturally by depreciation. 
There is a stationary capital stock for which investment and depreciation are equal. 
Investment is not long-term source of growth. Rather, it is the technical progress 
which essentially explains the long term growth. 
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Mankiw, Romer, and Weil postulate that the accumulation of traditional factors 
alone is not sufficient to explain all the problems of growth. Hence the adoption of a 
broader vision of capital by considering human capital, in a distinct way. By 
introducing this new factor, total factor productivity (TFP) decreases, intuitively, its 
share in explaining growth. This is the famous "Solow residual corrected." 
This extension of the Solow model implies that the income share of physical capital 
cannot be alone, an accurate measure of the overall importance of capital. A broader 
measure of capital increases the possibility that differences in capital intensity can 
explain, after all, differences in per capita income between countries. 
An important prediction of the neoclassical model is that the levels of product of 
countries with equivalent technology tend to converge to a given level, when these 
countries are in a stationary state. Recent work has shown that this hypothesis of 
unconditional convergence does not appear to be consistent with empirical evidence. 
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Nevertheless, the idea of conditional convergence is supported when one takes into 
account the effects of investment rates and policies on growth
5
.  
The dependence of the growth of exogenous technical progress in the neoclassical 
model and the apparent incompatibility of the unconditional convergence hypothesis 
with the current data, have incited investigations of alternative models of growth. 
Thus, endogenous growth models generate a link between public policy and long 
term growth, assuming production functions with constant or increasing returns in 
reproducible factors. 
In reaction to the shortcomings of neoclassical growth theory and its inability to 
explain some observed facts, the mid-80s saw the emergence of a group of models 
explaining the long-run growth endogenously by the relaxation of the assumptions 
of diminishing returns of the capital and in making the technical progress 
endogenous to the model. It is in this context that Paul Romer (1986, 1990, and 
1994) publishes article showing that technological change is endogenous. The 
technology is therefore a by-product of economic activity and is one of the 
                                               
5 This is the case for example in studies conducted by Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
Khan and Kumar (1993), Mankin, Romer and Weil (1992) 
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fundamental sources of growth. With Lucas (1988), they assume increasing returns 
of knowledge and human capital.  The new knowledge and new technologies result 
from investment in human capital (education and training), in the use of specialized 
personnel (R & D staff) and equipment. New knowledge, with innovation (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992) and public infrastructure (Barro, 1990)
6
 constitute the three 
significant Sources of Growth. 
Romer considers that the accumulation of knowledge is a factor of endogenous 
growth. The accumulation of knowledge produces positive externalities. He used the 
theory of "learning by doing" already formulated by Arrow (1962) which considers 
that it is in producing a firm acquires experience and therefore knowledge. A 
company accumulates knowledge that allows it to be more efficient, but also this 
knowledge serves other firms, by imitation effect or through the "turnover" of a 
workforce who benefited from the expertise. The accumulation of knowledge has a 
private productivity (the one the company benefits), but also a social productivity 
(the one which benefits the whole economy and society). 
                                               
6 It is important to note that these factors have already been identified in the literature before, but it is 
the first time that they are formalized and modeled. 
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In contrast to the accumulation of knowledge, models based on the accumulation of 
technological capital more generally insist on the issue of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction and its impact on the labor market (Aghion and Howitt 1992) or simply 
on the specialization of the economies and the persistent gap of differences of 
development (Romer 1990). So it is innovation and R&D which are the residual 
factor: the more R&D efforts are important, more growth is strong, and inversely.  
The first endogenous growth model with human capital is formulated by Lucas 
(1988), who, rather than introducing the stock of knowledge in the form of 
externalities, as Romer (1986), considers accumulative knowledge and private 
ownership, providing an individual incitation to education. Economic growth 
depends largely on individual efforts and social training, which themselves depend 
on the ability to save and therefore to forgo current consumption to invest in 
education. 
Although the fathers of the theory of endogenous growth namely Romer and Lucas 
rejected the role of the state, they accept, however, that the State should encourage 
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long-term growth. The question is not whether the state should intervene or not in 
economic activity, but how and how far can he intervene. 
In 1990, Barro shows that public expenditure is directly productive and should 
therefore be considered as a factor in the production function. The public sector 
contribution to growth includes expenditure on education (to increase human 
capital) and research and development, but also the infrastructure for transportation 
and communication. Like other accumulations, these expenditures have a 
cumulative effect: it increases the growth, broadening the tax base, induced an 
increase in government revenue and thus public spending, growth factor. This theory 
leads to demonstrate the need for continued public investment in a difficult situation. 
These theories are called endogenous growth theories because they seek to explain 
the growth by variables determined endogenously in the model. The main 
contributions of these theories consist of, in the one hand, the introduction of 
education and replacing the narrow vision of capital as physical stock by a broader 
concept including the knowledge and the stock of knowledge accumulated in the 
nation, thus the human capital and consequently the role of education is emphasized. 
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On the other hand it consists of the introduction of the possibility of externalities. 
These externalities that arise from the dissemination of knowledge and external 
benefits of human capital contribute to hinder the diminishing returns on physical 
capital accumulation. The development of research and development and the 
innovation process, a central factor in these models depends, or may be influenced 
by public policies (tax incentives, protection of intellectual property rights, provision 
of infrastructure services, etc.). The consequence of this is that the rate of long-term 
growth may be influenced by government intervention. The state has an important 
role to play in determining the rate of economic growth in the long term. 
 
4.2 The empirical studies on the factors of economic growth 
The 1990's saw the publication of several empirical works on growth factors. 
Indeed, the emergence of the new endogenous growth theory has led to focus 
empirical research on the determinants of growth. In this section we will review the 
results from empirical studies on explanatory factors of the economic growth. 
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Human capital 
The term ‗human capital‘ refers principally to workers‘ acquisition of skills and 
know-how through education and training. The majority of studies have measured 
the quality of human capital using proxies related to education (e.g. school-
enrolment rates). Human capital has been seen as the main source of growth in 
several endogenous growth models as well as one of the key extensions of the 
neoclassical growth model. 
Since the early 1990s, the empirical literature on the role of human capital in 
economic growth is full of contradictory results. The major recent contributions to 
the empirical literature on the role of human capital in economic growth began with 
an expanded version of the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956) proposed by Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992). In their model, they take as a 
measure of the rate of investment in human capital the proportion of the potential 
labor force enrolled in secondary education. The result of their estimation (on 98 
countries) shows that human capital positively and significantly affects the 
economic growth. The estimation (on 79 countries) of Islam has the same result but 
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unlike that of Mankiw, Romer &Weil (1992), the coefficient becomes non-
significant for the subset of middle-income countries. Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) 
without assuming the constant returns to scale and by using Kyriacou (1991) data 
show that the effect of human capital is not significant. Pritchett (1996) by using 
data from Barro and Lee (1993) and Nehru, Swanson & Dubey (1995) finds 
negative and sometimes significant effects
7
.  
Some developments of the theoretical literature on endogenous growth have 
proposed to remove the human capital from the production function (or to relativize 
the role it plays) and introduce it directly into the modeling of the growth of 
technical progress. It is not to consider human capital as a homogeneous factor of 
production in physical capital or labor but a wealth, for the production of knowledge 
and innovation. This type of model is mainly inspired by the theoretical article of 
Romer (1990). Much of the literature, in fact, neglects the possible heterogeneity of 
the effect of human capital between countries or different periods. 
                                               
7 The difference between the estimates of Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (1996) is mainly 
due to the explicit introduction of the amount of work by the firsts and to the expression of the human 
capital stock by value by the second (using the rate of return to education treated as a price). 
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Andreosso-O'Callaghan (2002) presents econometric work using panel data for the 
years 1980, 1990 and 1997 covering 10 Asian countries (China, South Korea, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). After 
his econometric work, the author finds that human capital (which is approximated 
by the rate of literacy or schooling) plays an essential role in the production, and 
thus in the growth of these countries. Aghion and Cohen (2004) also present 
regressions in panel data, considering a wider group of countries (110 countries), 
which the period of observations is from 1960 to 2000. By approximating human 
capital by the number of years of education of the workforce, they also found that 
the accumulation of this factor positively affects growth. 
one of the most surprising results of empirical studies of human capital and growth 
is that when the study sample is limited to OECD countries, the effect of human 
capital or education on economic growth is not significant, sometimes zero or even 
negative (Islam, 1995). We found a good example in Barro (2001), whose 
estimation of the effect of its preferred measure of human capital (higher education 
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of men) is 0.0000 when his growth regression is limited the sample of OECD 
countries. 
 
Public expenditure 
In endogenous growth models, public expenditure is a factor of growth as the human 
capital. However, in general, the empirical evidence of the nature of the relationship 
between public expenditure and economic growth are controversial. Devarajan, 
Swaroop and Zou (1996), for example, could not emphasize a significant 
relationship between growth and level of expenditure (measured by their share in 
GDP). The empirical literature on the effects of the composition of expenditures has 
also produced mixed results. Barro (1997) found that public expenditure on 
consumption as a percentage of GDP (calculated by subtracting defense spending 
and education) were negatively correlated to growth. Unlike, Devarajan, Swaroop 
and Zou (1996), showed a positive relationship between public consumption 
expenditure (measured by current expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures) 
and economic growth. Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) also note the existence of 
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a positive effect of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP (net of expenses and 
Military Education) on growth. Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997) have found no 
significant effect of the public expenditure in consumption on the GDP growth in 
Latin America. 
Among the cross-sectional analysis the most recent include those of Landau (1983), 
Kormendi and Meguira (1985), Barro (1991), Arthur (1991). Landau working on 
104 countries found a negative correlation between growth rate of per capita income 
and the share of public consumption in gross domestic product. Kormendi and 
Meguira working in 47 countries over the period 1950-1987 found a weakly positive 
impact, but not significant of the public consumption on growth. Barro, working in 
98 countries over the period 1980-1985 found a negative impact of the civil 
government consumption on growth: a 1 percentage point increase from this 
expenditure in national income depresses the rate of average annual growth income 
per head by 0.12 points. Public investment (including education and defense) has 
however a positive impact on growth, but statistically insignificant. Barro finds that 
this result does not necessarily mean that public investment has no effect on growth. 
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Arthus, working out of 21 OECD countries over the period 1980-1989, finds no 
positive effect of total public expenditure on growth. However, he highlights an 
effect of the level of public spending on research - development on the growth rate 
of gross domestic product. On the whole, the econometric works recently carried out 
in cross-sectional appear to indicate that the type of expenditure has to be 
distinguished. While public consumption expenditures have a negative impact on 
growth, this impact is not highlighted in the case of investment expenditures in the 
broad sense (including education and research). The latter generally have a positive 
impact, though often not significant. 
Aschauer, Munnell, and other authors use the estimation on time series to measure 
the impact of public investment on economic growth. ASCHAUER D.A (1989a, 
1989b) initiated the empirical research on the impact of public investment on 
growth. The model used is an aggregate production function in which output is a 
function of labor, private capital and public capital. He obtained, using data on U.S. 
rate of return of public capital extremely high, estimated between two to five times 
higher than that of private capital. In addition, he noted that the accumulation of 
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public capital has a positive effect on private investment. His findings suggest that 
active strategy of public investment can help grow. He says that if public investment 
is made in the areas where the public sector is competing with private enterprise, it 
is likely that it will oust them. 
Munnell AH (1990a) re-evaluating the original estimations of Aschauer (1989) and 
the work of Holz-Eakin (1988) found that the impact of global public capital on the 
output and productivity of the private sector is very important. For him, an increase 
of 1% of the stock of public capital causes an increase of 0.34% of production. 
REINHART and KHAN (1990) found that public investment has a statistically and 
insignificant effect on growth, and that the role of private investment was much 
more important in the process growth. However they estimate that it is possible that 
public investment has a positive effect on growth. The effect may come from the 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecommunications, and schools). 
Trade openness 
Trade openness has been used extensively in the economic growth literature as a 
major determinant of growth performance. Openness is usually measured by the 
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ratio of exports to GDP
8
. There is a substantial and growing empirical literature 
investigating the relationship between openness and growth. 
During the 70s, most empirical work used cross-sectional regressions on a selection 
of countries. The correlation coefficients were made either between export growth 
and GDP, or between an index representing the opening or trade policies and long 
term growth. Most of these studies have established a positive relationship between 
openness and growth.  
Dollar (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards 
(1998) and Greenaway et al. (1998), using cross-sectional regressions, found that the 
distortions due to state intervention in trade led to low growth rates. Ben-David 
(1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995) have also shown that only in open economies 
that we could observe an unconditional convergence. Sachs and Warner (1995) 
found that countries with open political grew at a rate of 4.5% annually in the years 
                                               
8 However, another measure, maybe more appropriate, is proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995). 
According to this, an economy is considered to be quite open if it satisfies the following five criteria: 
(a) average quota and licensing coverage of imports are less than 40%, (b) average tariff rates are 
below 40%, (c) the black market premium is less than 20%, (d) no extreme controls are imposed on 
exports, and (e) the country is not under a socialist regime.   
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1970 and 1980 and in contrast relatively closed countries had a growth rate of only 
0.7%. They note however that a strong relationship is difficult to find and justify. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) use a method of instrumental variables including 
geographical features, and confirm that international trade has an important and 
significant impact on growth. 
Harrison (1996) arrived at similar conclusions using a variety of indicators of 
openness. In making estimates of different methods (cross-section fixed effects, 
average over five years, first differences), the results suggest a positive relationship 
between openness and growth. However, it is not all measures of openness that were 
significant, despite the fact they were mostly of positive sign. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) criticize and question the results of four studies major. 
The authors have established that the positive correlation between openness and 
growth found in the work of Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs and Warner 
(1995) and Edward (1998) were not robust. 
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Innovation and R&D 
Innovation and R&D activities can play a major role in economic progress 
increasing productivity and growth. This is due to increasing use of technology that 
enables introduction of new and superior products and processes. This role has been 
stressed by various endogenous growth models, and the strong relation between 
innovation/R&D and economic growth has been empirically affirmed by many 
studies (see Fagerberg, 1987; Lichtenberg, 1992; Ulku, 2004). 
 
Inflation 
Other empirical studies have revealed that the macroeconomic environment affects 
economic growth. Indeed, the influence of the macroeconomic environment on long 
term growth has been an important area of investigation in terms of analytical and 
empirical. In a recent contribution to this literature, Fischer (1993) has found 
empirical evidence for a large group of countries a positive relationship between 
growth and macroeconomic stability. Regarding the relationship between inflation 
and economic growth, in general, the correlation is negative. De Gregorio (1991), 
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using a sample of 12 countries in Latin America over the period 1950-1985, has 
found a negative relationship between the level of inflation, the variability of 
inflation and growth Latin America.  Similarly Barro (1997), in a regression over the 
period 1960-1990, also found that inflation had a negative effect on growth rates of 
output per head (and on the share of investment in production). However, this effect 
is not significant, an increase in average of the inflation of 10 percentage points per 
year reduces the growth rate of real GDP per capita from 0.2 to 0.3 percentage 
points per year. According to the Tobin-Mundell effect, a high anticipated rate of 
inflation contribute to lower the real interest rate and causes an adjustment of the  
portfolio of real monetary asset to physic asset, contributing to an increase in the 
volume of investment and growth. According to Fischer (1993), inflation is a good 
indicator of the credibility and the ability of government to properly manage the 
economy of a country: a government by a high inflation rate has lost control of his 
economy. 
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Exchange rate 
Empirical studies raise the strong negative relationship between the variability of 
exchange rates and economic growth (Bosworth, Collins and Chen [1995]). There 
may have long-term consequences that go beyond the impact commonly practiced in 
the short term, on the competitiveness of companies in the country. An 
overvaluation tends to slow growth, while a significant undervaluation, although it is 
not excessive, will cause the acceleration of growth (Collins and Razin [1997]).  
Lahrèche-Révil [1999] uses a distortion index of average real exchange rate during 
the period. It is the ratio of the real exchange rate observed at the rate calculated 
from an equilibrium relationship of long-term of the Balassa model, estimated in 
section in each of the years available (1960-1993) and for a sample of approximately 
80 countries. It appears that the overall real exchange rate has little influence on 
growth and depreciation tends to accelerate it. The econometric analysis confirms 
the variable sensitivity of growth with the real exchange rate according to the initial 
level of development. 
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Financial Systems 
The relationship between economic growth and the financial sector has been studied 
in more detail with the work of Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973). According 
to these authors the financial sector plays an important role in the process of 
economic growth. The econometric studies on determinants of growth show that the 
level of financial intermediation is a good indicator of economic growth long term. 
Goldsmith (1969) studied, using the value of financial intermediary assets to GDP, 
the data available for 35 countries between 1860 and 1963 and finds that there is a 
certain parallelism between financial development and economic growth.  However, 
the study of Goldsmith suffers from several weaknesses. It does not take into 
account all the factors that influence economic growth, does not examine whether 
financial development is associated with the increase of productivity and capital 
accumulation. Similarly, in this study the size of financial intermediary chosen may 
not properly measure the functioning of the financial system. The last major 
weakness is that the correlation between the size of the financial system and 
economic growth does not identify the direction of causality.  
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King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, and 1993c) studied 80 countries over a period from 
1960 to 1989 and examine all financial factors that may affect the long term growth. 
The authors found a robust correlation between the degree of financial development 
and growth, investment and efficiency of capital. Financial development may also 
be linked to development of financial markets. Atje and Jovanovic (1993), from a 
study involving 75 countries, conclude the positive influence of financial markets on 
growth.  
Many other empirical studies (Polak, 1989, Patrick, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1996) confirm this link between financial development and growth. 
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CHAPTER 5: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function (Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995b, 
1995c) given by: 
Y= A0 (ApKp)
 α 
*(AhKh)
 β
*(ALL)
 1-α-β
                                                (1) 
 Where: 
Y: Real GDP 
L: labor 
KP and Kh: stocks of physical capital and human capital respectively 
A0: Coefficient of technology and global efficiency associated to the base period 
A0, Ah, AL: Coefficient of technological intensity in physical capital, human capital 
and labor, respectively 
Defining the coefficient of the global efficiency of the economy by: 
A=AL (A0Ap*Ah
β
)
 1/1-α-β
                                                 (2) 
The equation (1) can be rewritten: 
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Y=Kp
α
Kh
β
*(AL)
 1-α-β
                                                      (3) 
Where: 
A represents the intensity factor and the level of technology achieved by the 
economy. 
The labor and the global efficiency coefficient grow by following equations: 
L=L0e
nt                              
(4) 
A=A0e
gt+xq
                  (5) 
Where 
n: the rate of natural population growth 
t:time 
g: the growth rate of technical progress 
x: the vector of factors or policies that may affect the level of technology or 
efficiency of the economy 
q: the vector of coefficients relating to policies and other variables 
Given Sg and Sh the shares of national income invested in physical and human 
capital respectively. 
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We assume for the reason of simplicity of the model, the rate of depreciation of 
human capital and physical capital are the same (δ=5%). Consequently, physical 
capital and human capital are accumulated according to the following functional 
form: 
dKp/dt = SpY-δKp                       (6) 
dKh/dt = ShY-δKh                       (7) 
We assume that kp and kh represent the stock of physical capital and human, 
respectively, per unit of actual work. 
kp=Kp/AL 
kh=Kh/AL 
y=Y/AL 
In rewriting the functions of production and accumulation per capita we have: 
y=Kp
a
kh
b
                                   (3‘) 
dkp/dt =Spy-(n+g+δ)kp                (6‘) 
dkh/dt =Shy-(n+g+δ)kh                       (7‘) 
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In the steady state, levels of physical and human capital per capita are constant. So 
equations (6 ') and (7') are zero and we have, after substitution: 
kp*=(Sp
1-β
*Sh
β/n+g+δ)1/1-δ-β                 (8a) 
and 
kh*=(Sp
α
*Sh
1-α/n+g+δ)1/1-δ-β                 (8b) 
Substituting (8a) and (8b) in (3 ') and taking the logarithm, we have: 
Ln(y*)=(-ε/1-ε)Ln(n+g+δ)+(α/1-ε)Ln(sp)+(β/1-ε)Ln(sh)                         (9) 
Where ε=(α+β) 
Hence, taking the log of y=Y/AL and replacing A by its expression in (5), we 
obtain: 
Ln(y/L)=Ln(A0)+gt+Xθ-(-ε/1-ε)Ln(n+g+δ)+(α/1-ε)Ln(Sp)+(β/1-ε)Ln(Sh)       (10) 
Where (ε/1-ε), (α/1-ε), (β/1-ε) are the elasticities of per capita income relative to 
population growth and the share of income invested in physical capital and human 
respectively. The sum of the elasticities in comparison to Sp and Sh is equal to the 
elasticities in comparison to (n+g+δ) 
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Finally following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), the evolution of the product per 
capita to the level of steady state can be described by: 
dLn(y)/dt=λ [Ln(y*)-Ln(y)]                                   (11) 
Where λ= (n+g+δ) (1-e) is the speed of adjustment, and y the current income per 
capita 
The equation (11) implies that 
Ln(y*)=(1-e
λt
)Ln(y*)+e
λt
(Lny0)                               (12) 
Where: y0 is the income per capita at the initial period t0. 
Simplifying y0 in (12) and substituting, we obtain: 
Lny-Ln(y0)=(1-e
λt
)[- (ε/1-ε)Ln(n+g+δ)+ (ε/1-ε)Ln(sp)+(β/1-ε)Ln(sh)+Xθ-
Ln(y0)+gt+Ln(A0)]  (13)   
The adjustment coefficient (the speed of convergence) is obtained by the following 
formula (Ghura et Hadjimichael, 1995): 
λ=Ln(1+T.η)/T                                          (14) 
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T is the time‘s period considered. In this work, it covers the years 1960-1990 for the 
period of economic growth and the years 1990-2009 for the period of the economic 
recession of Japan. 
The variant of equation (13) is: 
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt+β2EXPTt + β3Lt + β4SETt + β5DRt+β6BCt+ 
β7INFLt+β8PAt+β9Nt + β10OILCt + β11FCt + β12EXRt + Ut 
 
5.2 Specification of the model 
The equation that we will estimate is GDP per capita growth. For this equation, the 
developments are described in the previous section. 
Taking into account the theoretical framework and the review of literature, the 
model we will estimate for the Japanese economic growth for the period 1960-1990 
will be specified as follows: 
Model 1: the factors explaining the Japanese economic growth 
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt+β2EXPTt+β3Lt+ β4SETt +β5BCt+ β6INFLt+β7PAt+β8Nt+ 
β9OILCt +Ut 
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Similarly, taking into account the theoretical framework and the review of literature, 
the model we will estimate to explain the Japanese recession will be specified as 
follows: 
Model 2: the factors explaining the Japanese recession  
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt +β2INFLt+ β3EXRt + β4DRt +β5FCt +Ut 
We use this model to assess the relative importance of various factors in causing 
Japanese recession. 
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL TESTING AND RESULTS  
We focus on this chapter, on the methodological aspects of our subject, on the 
empirical testing and on the analysis of the results of our regressions. 
 
6.1 Methodology 
We use a quantitative approach to observe the relationship between Japanese 
economic growth and the macroeconomics variables. The objective is firstly, to 
determine, the factors that influence economic growth of Japan and secondly to 
determine the causes of its recession. The data we use are time series data and are 
from the World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund and Bank of Japan. 
 
The effects of macroeconomic variables on economic activity are generally analyzed 
using endogenous growth models. To show these effects, a linearized production 
function of Cobb-Douglas is estimated. 
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We start our study by specifying the function of economic growth. Then, after doing 
the different tests (heteroscedasticity test, serial correlation, stationary test and 
Johansen Tests for Cointegration), we estimate the models by using Stata (software 
Econometrics) and analyze the results. 
 
Econometric Methodology 
We are here dealing with time series. We study the unit root properties of the 
variables, because as Gonzalo (1994) has shown in the presence of unit roots in the 
time series data, none of the usual test statistics for the ordinary least square 
regressions have standard distributions. We use the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit 
root tests (see Dickey and Fuller (1979) and (1981)).  
The ADF test entails estimating the following regression equation (with an 
Autoregressive process): 
△yt        yt-1        +   
 
   di△yt-1+vt 
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In the above equation, y is the relevant time series, △ is a first-difference operator, t 
is a linear trend and vt is the error term. The above equation can also be estimated 
without including a trend term (by deleting the term c2 t in the above equation).  
If   = 0, then there is no unit root. 
We preceded with the Johansen (1991) framework of cointegration tests, after we 
use the vector auto regression (VAR) to estimate our two models. 
 
6.2 Empirical Testing  
Model 1: the factors explaining the Japanese economic growth 
This model focus on variables that could affect positively Japan's economy since the 
objective is to find the factors in Japan‘s economic growth. Theoretically, as we 
noted it in Chapter 3 the spectacular performance of Japan in the decades following 
World War II is mainly linked to the contribution of three interrelated factors; labor, 
capital, and technology. However we have introduced the variable related to oil 
price shocks to explain the relative decline in growth in years 70s and 80s. After 
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having accepted these variables and taking into account the theoretical framework, 
the model to estimate becomes: 
 
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt+β2EXPTt+β3Lt+ β4SETt +β5BCt+ β6INFLt+β7PAt+β8Nt+ 
β9OILCt +Ut 
 
Definitions of variables and methods of the determination 
The variables used in the model are the following: 
GRGDP: Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita derived from 
World Bank Indicators and OECD National Accounts data files. The Gross domestic 
product per capita (GDP per capita) is an indicator of wealth and living standards 
and is based on constant local currency. It is obtained by dividing GDP by midyear 
population. It is the dependent variable of the model. This variable is used because 
the growth models lead to explain the growth rate and not the GDP level. And even 
on the econometric point of view, it will reduce the difficulties of data processing 
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associated with non stationary variables; although there are cointegration techniques 
to treat these variables. 
GCF: Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) derived from World Bank Indicators 
and OECD National Accounts data files. Gross capital formation (formerly gross 
domestic investment) is composed of change in inventories, Acquisition of 
valuables, Gross fixed capital formation (Building and construction, Machinery and 
equipment etc). 
EXPT: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) derived from World Bank 
Indicators and OECD National Accounts data files. Exports of goods and services 
include the value of all goods and services abroad provided to the rest of the world. 
The data includes the value of goods, freight, insurance, transport, etc. As a 
percentage of GDP, we can better understand the share of exports in the economy of 
the country. 
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L: Labor
9
 derived from World Bank indicators and International Labor 
Organization. It is here the rate of labor supplied for the production of goods and 
services during the period 1960-1990. 
SET: School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) derived from derived from World Bank 
Indicators. It refers to post-secondary education, third stage, and third level, 
requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of 
education at the secondary level.  The main institutions that provide it are Colleges, 
universities, institutes of technology and polytechnics.  
We will consider this variable as the human capital in our study. 
BC: Banking Credit (% of GDP) is derived from World Bank Indicators. It is the 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector and includes all credit to various 
sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, 
which is net. The sector of bank is composed of monetary authorities and deposit 
money banks, as well as other banking institutions. 
                                               
9  Here labor refer to participation rate and is percentage of total population ages 15 and more.  
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INFL: Inflation (annual %) derived from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and data files. It is measured by the consumer price index and 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly.  
PA: Patent application is derived from World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). It represents is a legal means to protect the results of scientific research and 
technological development. The fundamental purpose of a patent is to grant a 
monopoly for several years during which the inventor or any person who received 
the rights from it to exploit the invention or control the use of it against payment. 
This variable represents in our model the technology. 
N: Population growth (annual %) is derived from total population. It is Annual 
population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear 
population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage.  
OILC: Oil shock    1 for the year of oil shock 
                                 0 otherwise 
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Heteroskedasticity Test 
There is heteroscedasticity when the variances of the variables examined are 
different. This notion of heteroscedasticity is opposed to that of homoscedasticity, 
which corresponds to the case where the variance of the error of the variables is 
constant. 
H0: homoskedasticity 
H1: heteroskedasticity 
Table 19: Result of the Heteroskedasticity 
        Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)       0.07 
Prob > chi2   0.7914 
Since the p-value is not significant, we accept H1 and conclude there is no 
heteroskedasticity.  
Serial Correlation test 
H0: there is no autocorrelation 
H1: there is autocorrelation 
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Table 20: Result of the autocorrelation test 
       Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p)   chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 0.156 1 0.6927 
 
Since the p-value is not significant, we accept H1 and conclude there is no serial 
correlation. 
 
Stationarity test  
When using time data, it is essential that they maintain a constant distribution in 
time. This concept of stationarity should be checked for each series in order to avoid 
artificial regressions for which results could be "significant" when they are not. If a 
series is non stationary, we can convert it into stationary series by differentiating it. 
To examine the presence of unit root, the test of Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is used. 
Determination of the order of integration of series 
We start by testing the null hypothesis of unit root on the series in first difference 
DGRGDP (first difference of GRGDP), DGCF (first difference of GCF), DEXP 
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(first difference of EXP), DL (first difference of L), DSET (first difference of SET), 
DBC (first difference of BC), DINFL (first difference of INF), DPA (first difference 
of PA), and DN (first difference of N). 
The results are given in the table 21 and show that the first differences of the series 
are stationary. 
Now we apply the Dickey-Fuller tests on the series GRGDP, GCF, EXP, L, SET, 
BC, INFL, PA, N, and OILC. 
The results are given in the table 22 and show that the series GCF, EXP, SET, BC, 
INFL and PA are not stationary. But the series GRGDP, N and L are stationary. 
Indeed, except for variables GRGDP, L and N the estimated value of the ADF 
statistics for each of these series is higher than the critical value at 5%. 
Consequently: 
►the series GCF, EXP, SET, BC, INFL and PA are integrated of order 1 
►the variables GRGDP, L and N are integrated of order 1 if they are lagged by 1 
year. 
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Table 21: ADF test on the variables D(GRGDP), D(GCF), D(EXP), 
D(L), D(SET), D(BC), D(INFL), D(PA), D(N)  
Variables  t-ADF 1% 
Critical 
Value 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
10% 
Critical 
Value 
observation 
D(GRGDP)           
Lags    0  -6.89 -3.73 -2.99 -2.62 Stationary 
D(GCF)           
Lags    0 -3.44 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
D(EXP)           
Lags   0 -5.26 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 Stationary 
D(L)           
Lag    0 -6.22 -3.723 -2.98 -2.62 Stationary 
D(SET)           
Lags  0 -3.59 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
D(BC)           
Lags   0 -4.89 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 Stationary 
D(INFL)           
Lag    0 -5.77 -3.73 -2.99 -2.62 Stationary 
D(PA)           
Lags  0 -5.9 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
D(N)           
Lags   0 -3.64 -3.71 -2.98 -2.62 Stationary 
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Table 22: ADF test on the variables GRGDP, GCF, EXP, L, SET, BC, 
INFL, PA, N  
Variables  t-ADF 1% 
Critical 
Value 
5% 
Critical 
Value 
10% 
Critical 
Value 
observation 
GRGDP           
Lags  0 -3.28 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 I(0) Stationary 
1 -2.52 -3.73 -2.99 -2.62 I(1) 
            
GCF           
Lags      0 -2.26 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Non stationary 
            
EXP           
Lags      0 -1.87 -3.71 -2.98 -2.62 Non stationary 
L           
Lags    0 -4.22 -3.71 -2.98 -2.62  I(0) Stationary 
      1 -2.31 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 I(1) 
SET           
Lags  0 -1.64 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Non stationary 
BC           
Lags    0 -0.27 -3.71 -2.98 -2.62 Non stationary 
INFL           
Lag     0 -2.38 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 Non stationary 
PA           
Lags   0 1.39 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Non stationary 
N           
Lags   0 -3.64 -3.71 -2.98 -2.62 I(0) Stationary 
          1 -1.84 -3.72 -2.98 -2.62 I(1) 
          Note that for the dummy variable OILC we don‘t need to do the stationary test 
 
Tests for Cointegration 
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Another test to do when working with time series is that of cointegration. The aim is 
to detect if variables with a unit root have a common stochastic trend. If it is the 
case, there is an equilibrium relationship in the long term between the variables; and 
the linear combination of two variables from non-stationary series is stationary. In 
such situation, the formulation in difference leads to model misspecification and 
terms of correction of errors must be added.  
Johansen test for cointegration 
Trace test 
It is a test of the ratio of maximum of likelihood consisting in calculating the 
following statistic 
TR= -T                   
The null hypothesis tested is: r  , i.e. there are at most r vectors of cointegration. 
This test amounts to test the rank of the matrix ᴨp since testing the existence of r 
vectors of cointegration amounts to test the null hypothesis: Rg (ᴨp) = r. 
  Johansen (1988) showed that under the null hypothesis, the statistic TR has for 
asymptotic law the law of: 
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Trace            
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-1           
 
 
] 
Where W is a Brownian movement of matrix of variance-covariance the identity 
matrix. 
We reject the null hypothesis of r relations of cointegration when the statistic TR is 
greater than its critical value. 
We have three cases: 
– Rg (ᴨp) = 0. This means that r = 0: there is no cointegration relationship. In this 
case, Xt is integrated of order 1 but not cointegrated. It is then possible to estimate a 
VAR model on  Xt. 
– Rg (ᴨp) = r, with 0 < r < N: This means that Xt is cointegrated of rank r and then 
there are r relations of cointegration. An error correction model can then be 
estimated. 
– Rg (ᴨp) = N. In other words, r = N, i.e. that ᴨp is of full rank. In this case, Xt is 
stationary and there is no relation of cointegration. A VAR model can be directly 
estimated on Xt. 
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The null hypothesis is rejected if the trace statistic is greater than the critical value. 
Start by testing H0: r = 0. If it rejects, repeat for H0: r = 1. In our case we repeat until 
H0: r = 8 and we reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis of r relations of 
cointegrations (4.495 > 3.76) 
So, the results of the trace test show that we are in the third case i.e. r = N.  There is 
no relation of cointegration. A VAR model can be directly estimated on Xt. 
 
Table 23: result of the trace test for the model 1 
Trend: constant Number of observation =      29 
Sample:  1962 – 1990 Lags =                                     1 
maximum       trace 5% critical 
1% 
critical 
Rank parms LL eigenvalue statistic value value 
0 9 -790.8 
 
254.46 192.89 204.95 
1 26 -758.53 0.89 189.92 156 168.36 
2 41 -733.14 0.82 139.14 124.24 133.57 
3 54 -713.25 0.74 99.36
*
1 94.15 103.18 
4 65 -700.36 0.58 73.59 68.52 76.07 
5 74 -688.97 0.54 50.81 47.21 54.46 
6 81 -680.4 0.44 33.68 29.68 35.65 
7 86 -672.18 0.43 17.23 15.41 20.04 
8 89 -665.81 0.35 4.49 3.76 6.65 
9 90 -663.56 0.14 
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Model 2: the factors explaining the Japanese recession  
In this model, we will focus on variables that could affect negatively Japan's 
economy since the objective is to find the causes of the slump. Theoretically, as we 
have mentioned it in Chapter 4 the disappointing economic performance of Japan is 
mainly linked to the financial crisis and the appreciation of yen. After having 
accepted these variables and taking into account the theoretical framework, the 
model to estimate becomes: 
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt +β2INFLt+ β3EXRt + β4DRt +β5FCt +Ut 
 
Definitions of variables and methods of the determination 
The variables used in the model are the following: 
GRGDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %) derived from World Bank Indicators.  
GCF: Gross capital formation (% of GDP) derived from World Bank Indicators. 
Formerly known as gross domestic investment the gross capital formation consists 
of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories.  
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INFL: Inflation (annual %) derived from International Financial Statistics and 
International Monetary Fund and as it is shown above is measured by the consumer 
price index.  
EXR: Exchange Rate derived from International Monetary Fund. In general, the 
exchange rate is the relative price of one currency against another. 
DR: Discount Rates of central bank (%) derived from the bank of Japan. The 
discount rate is the cost of borrowing from the central bank. The Japan central Bank 
discount rate is the interest rate charged by the Bank of Japan on loans to banks. 
FC: Financial crisis          1 for the year of financial crisis 
                                          0 otherwise 
                                          
 Heteroskedasticity Test 
H0: homoskedasticity 
H1: heteroskedasticity 
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Table 24: Result of the Heteroskedasticity 
         Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)       7.05 
Prob > chi2   0.0079 
Since the p-value is significant, we reject H0 and conclude that there is 
heteroskedasticity.  
Serial Correlation test 
H0: there is no autocorrelation 
H1: there is autocorrelation 
Table 25: Result of the autocorrelation test 
              Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
    lags(p)   chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 0.004 1 0.95 
Since the p value is not significance at 5%, we accept H1 and conclude that there is 
no serial correlation. 
 
Stationarity test  
Determination of the order of integration of series 
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The results are given in the table 27 and show that the first differences of the series 
GRGDP, GCF, INFL and EXR are stationary. 
The results given in the table 26 show that the series GRGDP and GCF and are not 
stationary, the series INFL and EXR are stationary when there are lagged by 1 year; 
the variable DR is stationary with or without lags. 
Consequently: 
►the series GRGDP and GCF are integrated of order 1 
►The variables INFL and EXR are integrated of order 1 if they are not 
lagged by 1 year. 
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Table 26: ADF test on the variables GRGDP, GCF, INFL, EXR, and 
DR 
Variables  t-ADF 1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value 
Observations 
GRGDP           
Lags 0 -2.02 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
    1 -2.95 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
GCF           
Lags 0 -0.96 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
   1 -1.11 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
INFL           
Lag   0 -2.32 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
    1 -3.01 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(0) stationary 
EXR           
Lags 0 -1.89 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(1) 
    1 -3.71 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(0) stationary 
DR           
Lags 0 -3.96 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(0) Stationary 
   1 -10.59 -3.75 -3 -2.63 I(0) 
 
Table 27: ADF test on the variables D(GRGDP), D(GCF), D(INFL), 
D(EXR) 
Variables t-ADF 1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value 
observations 
D(GRGDP)           
Lags     0 -3.05 -3.75 -3 -2.63 stationary  
                    
D(GCF)           
Lags       0 -2.57 -3.75 -3 -2.63   
1 -3.33 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
           
D(INFL) -4.32 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
D(EXR) -3.39 -3.75 -3 -2.63 Stationary 
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Note that for the dummy variable FC we don‘t need to do the stationary test 
 
Tests for Cointegration 
Johansen test for cointegration 
 
Table 28: results of the trace test for the model 2 
 
Trend: constant Number of observation =      18 
Sample:  1992 – 2009 Lags =                                     1 
maximum       trace 5%critical 1%critical 
rank parms LL Eigenvalue statistic value value 
0 5 -87.6 
 
137.67 68.52 76.07 
1 14 -63.49 0.93 89.45 47.21 54.46 
2 21 -41.44 0.91 45.35 29.68 35.65 
3 26 -27.34 0.79 17.16*1 15.41 20.04 
4 29 -20.9 0.51 4.26 3.76 6.65 
5 30 -18.76 0.21 
   
 
Like for the model 1, the results of the trace test show that we are in the third case 
i.e. r = N.  There is no relation of cointegration. A VAR model can be directly 
estimated on Xt. 
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6.3 Results analysis  
All estimation results were obtained from Stata software. The considered threshold 
for the interpretation of results is 5%. It is the threshold of statistical significance. 
We say that a coefficient is significant if the probability level is less than 5%. 
In this section, we will in a first time, present and analyze the results of model 1 and 
those of Model 2 in a second time.  
 
Model 1: the factors explaining the Japanese economic growth 
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt+β2EXPTt+β3Lt+ β4SETt +β5BCt+ β6INFLt+β7PAt+β8Nt+ 
β9OILCt +Ut 
As we highlighted it in the precedent chapters, this model tries to find empirically 
and by using a vector-autoregression (VARs), the determinants of the Japanese 
spectacular performance in the decades following World War II,. 
The following table presents the result of the estimation of the model.   
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Table 29: Result of the estimation of the model 1 
GRGDP Coef. 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
L1. -0.2 0.08 -2.42 0.01 -0.37 -0.04 
L2. -0.25 0.08 -2.97 0.003 -0.42 -0.08 
GCF 0.64 0.17 3.7 0 0.3 0.98 
EXPT -0.17 0.25 -0.7 0.48 -0.66 0.31 
L 0.82 0.23 3.46 0 0.35 1.27 
SET -0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.98 -0.337 0.331 
BC -0.06 0.01 -5.07 0 -0.087 -0.038 
INFL -0.3 0.11 -2.52 0.01 -0.51 -0.06 
PA 3.13E-05 8.06E-06 3.89 0 0.00 0.00 
N -0.21 0.62 -0.34 0.73 -1.43 1.01 
OILC -1.58 1.13 -1.4 0.16 -3.81 0.64 
_cons -55.28 12.78 -4.32 0 -80.33 -30.22 
 
The results of the estimation of econometric model allow us to draw the following 
conclusions about the effects of different variables on the real per capita GDP 
growth rate of Japan. 
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and the gross capital formation: Our results show 
that this variable is important in determining growth of Japan. They confirm that the 
capital formation is an engine of growth. This variable is an outcome not only from 
the savings effort in the country but also the level of development of its financial 
sector, so it sums up the country's policies in encouraging savings, investment and 
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development of the financial sector for efficient channeling of savings into 
investment. Our results confirm those of several empirical studies, in particular the 
one of Edward Denison and William Chung highlighting the importance of this 
factor for economic growth in Japan. Furthermore the results of the model support 
the hypothesis that gross capital formation is positively related to growth rate. The 
effect is statistically significant at 5%. In terms of interpretation, we can say that 
gross capital formation positively and significantly influenced the economic growth 
of Japan over the period 1960-1990. An increase of 1% of the gross capital 
formation increases the growth of Japan by 0.6%.  
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and the export: this variable of economic policy is 
one of the most studied in the empirical literature. Even if there is tendency to 
conclude a positive correlation between trade openness and growth, there is no 
really strong evidence. In our estimation this variable is not significant and tends to 
have a negative effect. This result is not in accordance with our hypothesis.  
 ●Real per capita GDP growth rate and the labor: this variable is significant and has 
an important explanatory power. This result is not surprising; in all empirical studies 
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on economic growth of Japan we found that variable. The labor positively affects 
growth because it remains a factor of production. The results of the model support the 
hypothesis that labor is positively related to growth rate. The effect is statistically 
significant at 5%. The interpretation we can give is that the labor participation rate 
positively and significantly impacted the economic growth of Japan over the period 
1960-1990. It confirms, in particular, the results of Edward Denison and William 
Chung, and MIYOHEI SHINOHARA showing that the high rate of increase in the 
labor force has contributed to the high rate of Japanese economic growth. The results 
showed that an increase of 1% of the labor increases the growth of Japan by 0.8%. In 
fact, the first of the Japanese growth factors was an abundant supply and cheap, 
quality labor. Japan‘s labor was highly educated and well-equipped to absorb and 
master modern technology. Japan's labor force contributed significantly to economic 
growth, not only because of its availability and literacy but also because of its 
reasonable wage demands. Immediately after World War II, the transfer of numerous 
agricultural workers to modern industry resulted in rising productivity and only 
moderate wage increases. As population growth slowed and the nation became 
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increasingly industrialized in the mid-1960s, wages rose significantly. However, 
labor union cooperation generally kept salary increases within the range of gains in 
productivity. 
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and the human capital: here represented by 
tertiary school enrollment, this variable has a coefficient that is not significant at the 
5% level. This could be explained by the fact that it has to be combined with life 
expectancy. Indeed, in addition to the life expectancy it is the indicator of human 
capital. The results of the model did not support the hypothesis that economic 
growth is positively affected by human capital. This result is not consistent with 
those obtained in many studies, but is in accordance with the works of Benhabib & 
Spiegel (1994) and Kyriacou (1991) that showed that the effect of human capital is 
not significant.  
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and Banking Credit: the results showed that the 
Banking Credit negatively and significantly affects economic growth. This result is 
not in accordance with the hypothesis that Banking Credit has a positive impact on 
the Japanese growth. 
134 
 
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and inflation: the results of the model accept the 
hypothesis that economic growth is negatively affected by inflation. The effect is 
statistically significant at 5%. An increase of 1% in inflation reduces the growth of 
Japan by 0.28%. 
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and technology: the empirical results also support 
the model hypothesis that technology and growth are positively related. The effect is 
statistically significant at 5%. The interpretation is that the advance in technology 
positively and significantly affected the economic growth of Japan over the period 
1960-1990. It is not surprising given the importance of the use of technology in 
accelerating growth. This result is consistent with those obtained by MIYOHEI 
SHINOHARA and SABURO OKITA showing that the technological innovations 
acted as important stimuli and have greatly influenced the course of Japan's 
economic growth in the postwar economy of Japan. 
 
●Real per capita GDP growth rate and growth rate of population: the results of the 
model did not support the hypothesis that growth rate of population is positively 
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related to growth rate. However, the effect is not statistically significant at 5%.  The 
technology was the third factor of the Japanese growth. In the years following World 
War II, and under conditions similar to those at the time of the Meiji Restoration, 
Japan actively set about acquiring advanced technology from abroad. 
 ●Real per capita GDP growth rate and oil shocks: the results of the model showed 
that oil shocks affect the Japanese economic growth.  
 
Model 2: the factors explaining the Japanese recession  
GRGDPt = β0 +β1GCFt +β2INFLt+ β3EXRt + β4IRt +β5FCt +Ut 
This model examines the reasons for the slowdown in activity in Japan empirically 
using a vector-autoregression (VARs).  
The following table presents the result of the estimation of the model   
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Table 30: Result of the estimation of the model 2 
GRGDP Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1.grgdp -0.23 0.31 -0.74 0.45 -0.83 0.37 
GCF 0.15 0.18 0.83 0.40 -0.20 0.50 
INFL 0.82 0.60 1.38 0.17 -0.34 1.98 
EXR -15.90 4.65 -3.42 0.001 -25.02 -6.79 
DR -0.07 0.32 -0.22 0.82 -0.70 0.56 
FC -3.33 0.812 -4.1 0.00 -4.92 -1.73 
_cons 12.42 7.78 1.6 0.11 -2.83 27.68 
 
 The results of econometric estimation using the VAR model allow us to draw the 
following conclusions regarding the factors explaining the Japanese economic slump 
of the 1990s. 
● the exchange rate negatively and significantly influence the Japanese economic 
growth. This result confirms the one of Tamim Bayoumi which shows that increase 
in the real exchange rate lowered the economic growth of Japan. Indeed, our study 
shows that an increase of 1 in exchange rate leads to a decrease in real per capita 
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GDP growth rate by 15.90. The empirical results support the model hypothesis that 
the appreciation of the yen causes the Japanese recession. 
●The variable financial crisis negatively and significantly influenced the Japanese 
economic growth. This result is not surprising and confirms the argument that the 
collapse of asset price was an important factor in the recession. Indeed a year of 
financial crisis is followed by a decrease in real per capita GDP growth rate by 3.33. 
The empirical results support the model hypothesis that the financial crises causes 
the Japanese recession. 
● the discount rates negatively influence the Japanese economic growth. The 
hypothesis of Changes in real per capita GDP growth rate of Japan are directly and 
negatively related to the increase of the central bank discount rates during the period 
of recession is verified. However, the effect is not statistically significant at 5%.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
7. 1 Conclusion 
In this study, we tried to answer two important questions of the economy of Japan, 
namely what are the determinants of its performance and what are the causes of its 
recession. In the first question we are mainly concerned with the study of the factors 
that contributed to the nation's swift economic growth in the postwar year. In the 
second question, the objective is to determine the extent to which various factors 
contributed to the Japanese recession.  
We started with a description and an analysis of the characteristics of the Japanese 
economy over the period 1960-2009. The salient facts identified are the followings: 
an economy poor in natural resources, an economy with High GDP, an industrial 
economy, an important role of the state, significant weight of foreign trade, a 
Country with Strong International Economic Relations and a country with high rate 
of savings and investment. We then in a third chapter analyze performance during 
the postwar period and the disappointing performance during the 1990s of the 
Japanese economy. We have devoted a chapter to review the theoretical and 
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empirical literature on economic growth factors. The theoretical framework and the 
model specification have been described in chapter five. The chapter six has been 
devoted to the methodology, the empirical testing and to the analysis of the results 
after having quantified the effects of the considered variables on the growth of 
Japan. 
The results of our estimates highlight three important factors as reasons for Japan's 
economic performance during the period 1960-1990. It has been found that during 
that period, the increased labor, the increased capital stock, and the advances in 
knowledge have been instrumental in explaining growth, further bolstering 
economic theory on this subject. 
The results of our estimates also highlight the reasons for the marked slowing of 
growth in Japan in the 1990s. It shows that during the period 1990-2009 the 
appreciation of the yen, the financial crisis and the discount rate were instrumental 
in the decline of the Japanese economy. 
These results we get are for the most part consistent with those obtained in empirical 
studies of this kind. 
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7. 2 Policy Recommendations 
Lessons from the results presented in previous chapter show how growth can be 
accelerated if the government acts on a particular factor.  
Based on the results of model 1 this study will do the following recommendations: 
→Policy of maintaining a high rate of employment must be established in order to 
have a high participation rate of labor. 
→Technology policy should be improved by promoting research and development 
because R&D is a vital source of technological progress.  As it is shown the 
advances in technical know-how has played in important role in the Japanese 
development since the end of World War II. 
→The investment promotion policy needs to be strengthened. 
The results also show how some decisions can lead to slump in growth and measures 
have to be taken.  
Based on the results of model 2 we will do the following recommendations: 
→The mechanisms of anticipation and prediction of the crisis should be created to 
lessen their impact on the economy.  
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→Japan must learn from its lost decade: not fundamentally remedy weaknesses in 
the financial sector amount to compromise the smooth functioning of monetary and 
fiscal policies and expose the economy to adverse shocks later. In this regard, 
priority should be given promptly to the identification of losses to assets affected. 
Public funds can help to recapitalize the banking sector, if banks are unable to raise 
sufficient capital in the market. 
→A strict control of fluctuations in the yen against the dollar must be established in 
order to prevent the negative effects of its appreciation on growth. 
 
7. 3 Limitations of the study and prospects for future research  
Limitations 
We have to note that our study on the determinants of Japan's economic growth did 
not permit to grasp all possible aspects of the factors of economic growth. Certain 
variables such as the government policy, the economy of scale, the effect of weather 
on farming, the household saving, the private consumption etc. have also been 
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identified as the factors of Japanese economic growth in other studies but not taken 
in account in this present study.  
The other major difficulty encountered is related to the availability of data. Indeed 
for some variables the data are available only from 1990. This lack of data is a limit 
to our study because it would have been more complete in the presence of variables 
such as research and development, infrastructure, public investment, private 
investment and foreign direct investment for a more exhaustive explanation of the 
factors of economic growth in Japan. 
The gap between the reality and the results of our estimate result precisely from the 
omission of certain variables that may affect the growth of the economy of Japan. 
 
Prospects for future researches 
A unique and universal recipe to guide policy makers in growth does not exist, 
according to a recent study by the World Bank that recommends abandoning the 
simple formulas and research always disappointed of ―optimal practices‖ in favor of 
a more thorough economic analysis of what, in each country is stubbornly barriers to 
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growth. According to the same study of the World Bank: ―Any process of growth is 
punctuated by the appearance and the removal of successive barriers‖, therefore, a 
future study aimed at identifying obstacles to Japanese economic growth and 
showing how to eliminate these obstacles is necessary because it is in relying on the 
domain that bridle the more the growth that a country would have more luck to 
harvest the fruits of its efforts. 
 
We're not going to finish this study without mentioning the natural disaster that hit 
Japan in 11 March 2001. The great earthquake in eastern Japan, the most powerful 
ever recorded in Japan, caused the worst disaster in the history of the country since 
the World War II. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused massive casualties 
and economic damage of great magnitude. Japanese authorities estimate the amount 
of damage to public facilities, housing and private fixed capital between 3.3% and 
5.2% of GDP of 2010.  In addition to the usual risks that may weigh on global trade, 
exchange rates and commodity prices, considerable uncertainty surrounds the 
outlook in Japan, in particular as regards the duration of supply disruptions in 
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electricity, the problems at the Fukushima nuclear power plant or the magnitude of 
public spending on reconstruction and timing. Therefore it is extremely difficult to 
predict when the economic rebound will occur and what will be the effect. 
The earthquake hit Japan when the country seemed to have returned to a phase of 
expansion after the economic downturn occurred in the latter part of 2010. The 
immediate aftermaths of the terrible disaster are no doubt huge, extending beyond 
the regions devastated by the earthquake and tsunami. In fact, the damage suffered 
by the plants in the Tohoku region has disrupted supply chains of major industrial 
products beyond the borders of Japan, particularly in the automotive sector. 
However, the experience of disasters that hit Japan and other developed countries in 
the past suggests that the short-term negative impact on economic output will be 
followed by a recovery as the reconstruction effort.  
Following this present study, others studies could focus, given the magnitude of 
economic damages, on the consequences of this catastrophe and the measures to be 
taken to prevent the Japanese economy to enter in a prolonged recession from 2012.  
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APPENDICES 
Table 31: The variables of the model 1 
   Year 
 
GRGDP 
    
GCF 
    
EXPT 
       
L 
    
SET 
    
BC 
     
INFL      PA 
     
N OILC 
1960 11.04 39.12 10.72 60.12 24.33 60.3 5.4 53876 0.9 0 
1961 11.04 39.12 9.27 60.12 24.33 59.78 5.4 53876 0.89 0 
1962 7.89 38.12 9.43 60.11 24.33 76.07 6.77 53876 0.93 0 
1963 7.37 39.12 9.03 60.11 24.33 82.9 7.66 53876 1.01 0 
1964 10.51 39.12 9.49 63 24.33 83.97 3.84 55556 1.04 0 
1965 4.68 37.12 10.51 60.1 24.33 88.07 6.59 60796 1.07 0 
1966 9.63 39.12 10.57 63.1 24.33 89.97 5.08 62962 0.91 0 
1967 10.05 39.12 9.65 63.2 24.33 90.32 3.97 61721 0.93 0 
1968 12.5 40.12 10.11 64.1 24.33 87.35 5.37 71114 0.33 0 
1969 10.17 39.12 10.55 63.2 24.33 87 5.24 77132 2.06 0 
1970 3.11 39.12 10.66 61.2 24.33 137.3 7.67 100513 1.13 0 
1971 3.36 35.84 11.56 61.2 24.33 150.8 6.27 78425 1.28 0 
1972 6.9 35.62 10.44 62.2 24.33 163.9 4.96 101328 1.4 0 
1973 7.14 38.17 9.9 63.2 24.33 161.3 11.61 115221 0.82 0 
1974 -3.09 37.41 13.42 60.2 24.33 157.5 23.18 121509 1.9 1 
1975 1.45 32.86 12.63 60.2 24.33 168 11.74 135118 1.6 0 
1976 3.2 31.92 13.37 62 24.33 173.7 9.41 135762 0.73 0 
1977 3.39 30.93 12.92 62 24.33 176.5 8.14 135991 0.96 0 
1978 4.32 30.99 10.97 63 24.33 182.7 4.18 141517 0.9 0 
1979 4.6 32.58 11.41 63 24.33 187.6 3.72 150623 0.84 0 
1980 2.01 32.32 13.51 63.2 30.87 193.1 7.8 165730 0.78 1 
1981 3.41 31.24 14.49 63.2 30.87 198.8 4.91 165730 0.73 0 
1982 2.67 29.94 14.29 63.4 30.87 209.2 2.73 165730 0.67 0 
1983 2.36 27.95 13.72 63.8 30.87 218.7 1.89 227708 0.68 0 
1984 3.8 27.83 14.82 63.5 30.87 223.7 2.25 256195 0.63 0 
1985 5.68 28.36 14.19 63 29.16 226.5 2.04 274348 0.61 0 
1986 2.2 28.12 11.17 62.9 29.17 236.2 0.61 290132 0.6 0 
1987 3.59 28.65 10.21 62.7 29.17 249.9 0.12 310908 0.49 0 
1988 6.69 30.84 9.83 62.6 29.17 257.6 0.64 308775 0.42 0 
1989 4.94 32.01 10.3 62.8 29.17 264 2.28 317353 0.4 0 
1990 5.21 32.72 10.35 63.3 29.07 267 3.06 332952 0.34 0 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
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Table 32: The variables of the model 2 
 
        
Year 
        
GRGDP 
          
GCF 
          
INFL 
        
EXR 
             
DR                                                                                                    
            
FC 
1990 5.21 32.72 3.06 0.74 6 0 
1991 3 32.44 3.26 0.8 6 1 
1992 0.57 30.75 1.71 0.8 4 1 
1993 -0.07 29.42 1.27 0.89 2.7 1 
1994 0.52 28.25 0.69 1 1.75 0 
1995 1.49 28.34 -0.12 0.97 0.5 0 
1996 2.37 28.87 0.13 0.86 0.5 0 
1997 1.297 28.34 1.76 0.77 0.5 1 
1998 -2.29 26.25 0.66 0.86 0.5 1 
1999 -0.33 24.84 -0.33 0.98 0.5 1 
2000 2.68 25.43 -0.71 0.87 0.5 0 
2001 -0.04 24.75 -0.75 0.76 0.35 1 
2002 0.03 23.06 -0.89 0.83 0.1 0 
2003 1.19 22.84 -0.24 0.93 0.1 0 
2004 2.7 23.03 -0.01 0.96 0.1 0 
2005 1.92 23.56 -0.27 0.84 0.1 0 
2006 2.05 23.79 0.24 0.85 0.1 0 
2007 2.35 23.7 0.06 0.88 0.1 0 
2008 -1.15 23.6 1.37 1.09 0.1 0 
2009 -5.12 20.36 -1.35 1.11 0.1 0 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
